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INTRODUCTION
NINE-YEAR-OLD CARLEY CHRISTIE was diagnosed
with Wilms Tumor, a rare and malignant kidney cancer.' The
Christie's Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) did not in-
form the family that National Cancer Institute Guidelines
(NCIG) forbid surgeons without previous Wilms Tumor experi-
1. See Edmund Sanders, HMO Hit with Big Fine for Denying Care, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, Nov. 18, 1994, at 3B (discussing the first time California fined a health care plan for
failing to provide quality care to a member); Harry W. Christie, HMOs-What We Don't Know! 1
(Nov. 1, 1994) (describing one family's battle to get coverage for Wilms Tumor surgery)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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ence from perforning surgery to remove these particular malig-
nant tumors. Rather, their HMO recommended a plan-affiliated
general surgeon with no Wilms Tumor experience nor any pe-
diatric experience generally.' The Christies were neither in-
formed of their daughter's medical options nor told about the
NCIG mandate.' As over fifty-five million people in the Unit-
ed States receive their health care from HMOs,4 Carley Chris-
tie could be your neighbor, a passenger in your car-pool, or
even a member of your own family.'
There has recently been an influx of media attention on
the existence of "gag provisions" in contracts between physi-
cians and for-profit HMOs. Under the threat of deselection or
perhaps more subtle reprisal, gag provisions prohibit physicians
from communicating information to patients about treatment
options, payment policies, specialist referral, or other plan poli-
cies. For the purposes of this Note, that is the definition of a
"gag provision."
Coupled with having their tongues tied regarding essential
communications to patients, many physician-HMO contracts
are terminable at-will.6 In other words, an HMO can terminate
2. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 3B; Christie, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Carley Christie was not advised to seek the medically necessary care that she needed
from plan-affiliated physicians because they were "gagged" from disclosing any information that
would undermine her confidence in her HMO. Fortunately, she has parents who had the initiative
and wherewithal to seek treatment alternatives not covered by her HMO. Carley Christie received
the surgery and treatment that was medically necessary from non-plan affiliated surgeons and is
presently in recovery. However, due to the enormous amount of trust that patients generally
bestow upon the advice of their physicians, many patients in the Christie's position, would not
have sought care outside their HMO. Thus, the "happy ending" of Carley Christie's story is prob-
ably not the norm. The Christie family spent over one year lobbying state regulators to act against
TakeCare Inc., their HMO, for neither advising them of the care that was medically necessary for
their daughter, nor paying for their daughter's treatment when they went outside the HMO for a
Wilms Tumor specialist. The family won an arbitration case requiring TakeCare Inc. to pay all
medical costs. Subsequently, the Department of Corporations, (DOC) which regulates California
HMOs fined TakeCare Inc., $500,000 for failing to provide quality care to Carley Christie. It is
believed to be the first time DOC has fined a health plan for falling to provide quality care. See
Sanders, supra note 1, at 3B; Christie, supra note 1, at 3-4.
4. See American Medical Association, Background Information About "Gag" Clauses 1
[hereinafter Background Information About "Gag" Clauses] (unpublished information provided
by the AMA on file with author). See also Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging
Theories of Liability in the Managed Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285, 288 (1995)
(discussing the growth of HMO enrollment by 1988 from modest beginnings).
5. One possible explanation for why few cases have been brought to public attention
regarding the inadequate quality of care due to gag provisions is because many patient-HMO
contracts require the patient to forgo the right to a jury trial in favor of binding arbitration. See,
e.g., Sanders, supra note 1, at 3B; Christie, supra note 1, at 2.
6. An "employee at-will" can be discharged at any time, for any reason, or for no reason
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any participating physician on short notice for any reason, and
at the same time, not reveal to the physician or his patients the
reason for termination. The existence of gag provisions and
terminable at-will employment places physicians in an odious
position: if they offer services prohibited by gag clauses which
they believe should be provided, they run the risk of termina-
tion without recourse.
For purposes of this Note, a physician "blows the whistle"
on the existence of a gag provision when she either complains
to the managed care entity directly or when she discloses to a
patient that the HMO cannot provide the patient with the care
that he needs. For physicians who are terminable at-will, both
forms of disclosure are lethal because either may lead to re-
taliation by their employer. Therefore, whistle-blowing by
either form of disclosure must be protected. Critical analysis
will illustrate, however, that present common law and statutory
whistle-blower protections are not sufficient.
Despite the abundance of criticism of these gag clauses,
there is no in-depth analysis of the legal ramifications of gag
provisions on the doctor-patient relationship or the effect of
these gag clauses when coupled with employment that is termi-
nable at-will. Furthermore, there are few proposals which will
adequately address this problem. This Note will focus on these
concerns.
Part I provides the foundation of my analysis by explain-
ing the managed care backdrop in which gag provisions have
arisen. This atmosphere makes it increasingly difficult for
physicians to practice medicine independently from managed
care entities. Next, this Part discusses, from the perspectives of
both physicians and HMOs, what exactly gag provisions are,
who they affect, and what they encompass.
Part H investigates the two primary ways that the enforce-
ment of gag provisions breaches physicians' fiduciary duty to
patients. First, gag provisions cause an unlawful conflict of
interest for physicians. Second, gag clauses prevent physicians
at all. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (Tenn. 1915).
Accordingly, if an at-will employment relationship exists, employment can be terminated "for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong." Id.
190 [Vol. 7:187
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from adequately obtaining informed consent from their pa-
tients. This analysis results in the conclusion that gag provi-
sions are unlawful; however, as a pragmatic matter, legal anal-
ysis cannot stop there.
Part III examines potential common law and statutory
protections for physicians who refuse to abide by gag provi-
sions and are subsequently subject to reprisals. First, I examine
the common law employment-at-will doctrine and its public
policy exception which should provide physicians with some
legal recourse should their termination result from their refusal
to abide by gag clause restraints. Next, I examine state statute
whistle-blower provisions which arguably may also afford
physicians relief if they are discharged due to their refusal to
obey gag provisions. Lastly, I critically examine legislation that
is either pending or has recently been passed, which purports
to deal with the existence of gag provisions. Finally, Part III
concludes that neither statutory nor common law remedies
afford physicians the protection that they need to adequately
provide necessary care without jeopardizing their employment
status.
Finally, in Part IV, I propose several recommendations
which I strongly encourage legislatures to implement in up-
coming bills. Without including these protections in state legis-
lation, physicians will not receive the protection that they need
to provide the medical and ethical care that they deem neces-
sary.
I. GAG PROVISIONS: BACKGROUND
A. The Managed Care Backdrop: Physicians' Increased
Dependence on HMOs for Patient Enrollment
The U.S. health care system has been moving steadily
away from delivery of health care through independent, fee-
for-service7 practitioners and towards more integrated ap-
7. The fee-for-service method of payment "refers to the typical relationship between a
physician and a patient in which the patient pays a separate fee for each service rendered by the
independent physician." Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability
for HMOs, 20 Loy. U. CHi. LJ. 841, 841 n.1 (1989) citing Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical
Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE LJ. 1375, 1376-77
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proaches. Managed care refers to a variety of methods of fi-
nancing and organizing the delivery of comprehensive health
care where a primary emphasis is on controlling costs to pa-
tients and third-party payers.8 For more than fifty-five million
people in the United States, health care is provided by HMOs.9
HMOs offer basic and supplemental health care in exchange
for a periodic, prepaid, per-capita premium. °  IMOs
reimburse health care providers through a negotiated, capitated
payment made on behalf of each person or family unit enrolled
in the plan." In addition, HMOs shift the risk, particularly the
cost of office facilities and medical malpractice liability, onto
doctors. 2
Although it is recognized that no system of reimbursement
is devoid of financial self-interest, 3 the movement from fee-
for-service payment for care to capitated coverage has been
problematic. 4 Just as fee-for-service gave physicians the in-
centive to over-prescribe treatment, under new fee arrange-
ments, physicians can profit if they cut back services to pa-
tients. 5 In addition, most IMOs have financial incentives and
bonuses available for physicians if they limit the treatments
that they provide and recommend. 6 Though encouraging phy-
(1975).
8. See generally John K. Inglehart, Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331
HEALTH POL'Y REP. 1167, 1167 (1994) (defining the concept of managed care and its primary
goals).
9. See Background Information About "Gag" Clauses, supra note 4, at 1; News: Doctors
Agree on Discussing HMO Coverage With Patients, (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 28, 1995)
(available on Westlaw).
10. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 4, at 289. There are several basic structures of
HMOs. Typically, HMOs organize their physician relationships in one of three ways: staff, group,
or independent practice associations. For further discussion, refer to id. at 292-94.
11. See id. at 289.
12. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1995).
13. See Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde? 273 JAMA
338, 338 (1995) (discussing the growth of managed care entities and ramifications on health care).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 339. See also Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 12, at 1706. But see
Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 26, 1995) (transcript available on Westlaw)
(transcribing the comments of Dr. Sam Ho regarding the differences between fee-for-service and
HMO incentives and the consequences of those incentives on quality control). "The November
8th issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association compared fee-for-service patients
and HMO patients with diabetes and hypertension and found no significant changes, no
significant difference in their health outcomes, so basically, what we're saying is that HMOs and
fee-for-service medicine both practice the same level of care." Id.
16. See Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors, TimE, Jan. 8, 1996, at 50 (illustrating HMO
192 [Vol. 7:187
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sicians to be more cost-effective by using bonuses, fee with-
holds, and other financial incentives to withhold care is not
inherently unethical, it certainly can be depending on the de-
sign and intensity of the incentive. 7 Finally, many physicians
practice medicine under the threat of deselection from their
managed care entity if they do not make enough money for
that entity. 8 This may occur despite a physician's stellar suc-
cess rate, impeccable quality of care, unquestionable compe-
tence, and complete patient satisfaction. 9
Why have so many physicians joined managed care enti-
ties if their treatment options are increasingly based on eco-
nomics rather than on their own medical judgment? Have all
medical doctors turned into Mr. Hydes? Have physicians aban-
doned their sense of humanity, professionalism, and ethical
responsibilities? The reality of today's delivery of health care
has forced physicians to join managed care entities or lose
substantial numbers of patients." Just as patients are forced
into managed care by their employers and insurers, likewise,
physicians are pressured to sign up with HMOs or surrender
patients.2
It takes little imagination to conceptualize the effect that
this shift to economic values has had on the what one tradi-
tionally views as foundations in the practice of medicine: "doc-
tors putting patients' interests first above all others, including
the physicians' pecuniary interests; doctors being true to medi-
financial incentives to physicians for limiting hospital stays). For example, in David
Himmelstein's U.S. Healthcare contract he was promised bonuses based on a formula for keeping
his patients out of hospitals. However, if the total number of days patients spent hospitalized
exceeded a fixed number, he would receive no money at all. Id. See also Council on Ethical &
Judicial Affairs, AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 330-31 (1995)
[hereinafter AMA Ethics] (describing financial incentives used to encourage physician to make
cost-conscious treatment decisions).
17. See AMA Ethics, supra note 16, at 333.
18. This process is commonly referred to as economic credentialing. Economic
credentialing "has nothing to do with professional quality and competence," but rather is solely
based on economic criteria. Howard L. Lang, Curb Economic Credentialing, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 28. Economic credentialing should be distinguished from the peer review
credentialing process which evaluates physicians based on quality and competence factors in
order to promote high care quality. See Brad Dallet, Economic Credentialing: Your Money or
Your Life! 4 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 338-39 (1994).
19. See Dallet, supra note 18, at 325-26.
20. See Gray, supra note 16, at 50.
21. Cf Joan Beck, The Scary New World of Health Care, CHm. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1995, at 3
(discussing the economic power of HMOs over those who provide care).
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cal-ethical values before economic values; ... and doctors
putting love of the profession and its knowledge above concern
for self."2 The existence of gag provisions in provider con-
tracts epitomizes this shift to economic values and completely
strangles a physician's ability to place quality of care before
cost containment.
B. What are Gag Provisions and Whom Do They Affect?'
Gag provisions are located in physicians' contracts24 and
prevent physicians, either explicitly or implicitly, from giving
patients information about treatment options that are not cov-
ered by their health plans, even if the treatment options are
necessary, safe, and effective.' Gag clauses may also prevent
physicians from disclosing to patients the form of payment
system they are on, which as discussed previously, can affect
the amount and possibly the quality of care provided by the
physician.26 Finally, gag provisions may prevent physicians
from referring sick patients to specialists outside the patients'
health plans, even if those specialists have rare expertise in the
22. Eric J. Cassell, The Legal Implications of Health Care Cost Containment: A Sympo-
sium: Commentary, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 771,776 (1986). "When money is the major value
of medical practice, the dominant force is greed." Id. at 771.
23. It is interesting to note, that to date, only one lawsuit has been filed which specifically
criticizes the unlawful existence of gag provisions in physicians contracts. See In re League of
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Debuono, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 21, 1995) (unpublished
petition on file with author).
24. This Note will only discuss gag provisions that are located in physician-HMO
contracts. However, the AMA states that in addition to the gag provisions located in provider
contracts, some patient-HMO contracts may contain gag clauses as well. These "patient gag
clauses" prohibit patients from criticizing HMO practices and policies and prohibit patients from
seeking care outside the plan. For example, HIP of New Jersey refused to authorize surgery for a
fourteen-year-old boy with a brain tumor. His parents sought opinions from five outside pediatric
neurosurgeons, and all of them agreed surgery should take place immediately. When the parents
sued HIP for coverage, HIP invoked a gag provision in the contract. HIP stated that they would
not pay the claim because the parents violated their contract by receiving counsel from physicians
not affiliated with the Plan. HIP finally paid pursuant to a settlement agreement. See Background
Information about "Gag" Clauses, supra note 4, at 1; Diane Curcio, Boy Gains Brain Surgery,
STAR LEDGER, Mar. 16, 1990, at 12.
25. See News Release from American Medical Association, AMA Calls Managed Care
Providers to Cancel Gag Clauses and Submit Contracts for Ethical Review (Jan. 23, 1996)
[hereinafter AMA Calls to Cancel Gag Clauses] (discussing the harmful effects of gag clauses on
patient care) (on file with author).
26. See H.M.O. Gag Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18 (declaring that if health main-
tenance organizations impose "gag" rules on doctors unfavorable results for patients may result).
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type of care needed. 7 Not all HMO-physician contracts con-
tain gag provisions; however, the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) estimates that gag clauses affect tens of millions
of Americans.
1. From Physicians' and Patients' Perspectives
Physicians argue that gag provisions restrict their ability to
advocate on behalf of their patients.29 It is certainly true that
gag provisions are extremely broad in what they prohibit physi-
cians from disclosing. For example, the following gag clause is
quoted from an actual physician-HMO contract:
Physicians shall take no action nor make any communication
which undermines or could undermine the confidence of
Enrollees, potential Enrollees, their employers, Plan Sponsors,
or the public in this organization or in the quality of care which
this organization's Enrollees receive."
This clause forbids physicians from telling patients anything
that might undermine patients' trust in their HMO.3' For ex-
ample, physicians with this clause in their contract could not
advise patients that the HMO is not staffed with a physician
who has the expertise to most properly treat their medical
condition.32 Further, by forbidding physicians from making
any communication that might undermine patients' confidence,
physicians are precluded from recommending services not
27. See generally AMA Calls to Cancel Gag Clauses, supra note 25.
28. Background Information About "Gag" Clauses, supra note 4, at 1. The AMA states that
U.S. Healthcare, ChoiceCare, HIP of New Jersey, Aetna, and Cigna, which are some of the largest
health insurance companies in the country, have gag-type policies and protocols. Id. Gag rules
also appear in physician contracts written by Foundation Health Corp., FHP/TakeCare, Health
Net, and CaliforniaCare according to The HMO Gag Rule, SACRAMENTO BEE FINAL, Apr. 20,
1995, at B8 (decrying the existence of gag provision's and the detrimental impact gag provisions
have on physicians' abilities to make honest recommendations about professional services). See
also Rachel Kreier, N.Y. Suit Fights Increasingly Common HMO "Gag Rules," AM. MED. NEws,
Dec. 11, 1995, at5 (discussing the frequent use of confidentiality clauses in HMO contracts); Tim
Bonfield, ChoiceCare to Docs: Hush! CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 8, 1992, at Al (focusing on
the controversy involving the gag clause in ChoiceCare's, Cincinnati's largest HMO, contracts
with physicians); Tim Bonfield, Physicians Have Criticized Latest Contract with ChoiceCare,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1992, at Fl (citing that 85% of the doctors practicing in the Cin-
cinnati area signed the ChoiceCare's 1993 contract thereby agreeing to abide by a gag rule).
29. See Kreier, supra note 28, at 5.
30. Background Information About "Gag" Clauses, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added).
31. See id.
32. See id.
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offered by the HMO even if such services would be safer,
more effective, or less costly.33
Another actual gag provision states:
During the term of the Agreement and each renewal thereof,
physicians shall discuss any concerns relating to compensation
and other matters hereunder exclusively with IPA and not with
Enrollees. Physicians shall not, directly or indirectly, counsel or
advise any Enrollee to disenroll from any Contracting Payor
program or product or to access such program or product
through any person or entity other than the EPA. 4
This clause forbids physicians from disclosing what form of
payment system they are on (i.e., fee-for-service or capitation
which as discussed previously may affect both quantity and
quality of care). Further, this gag clause prevents physicians
from advising patients which plan might best suit their particu-
lar medical needs. Finally, this clause forbids physicians from
telling a patient that his present plan will not adequately pro-
vide for his medical needs.
A third actual gag clause states:
In no event shall Physician market or offer to Enrollees services
beyond those which are medically necessary or which are pre-
scribed by the referring participating physician.35
This gag provision prohibits physicians from telling patients
about expensive treatments and referring patients to the best
specialists or facilities for treatment if such centers of excel-
lence do not participate in the plan.36
Finally, a fourth gag provision states:
Provider expressly waives Provider's rights to contact [Plan]
Members in any way about the termination of this Agreement,
including those Members who are patients of the Provider, and
expressly agrees not to communicate in any form or manner
with such Members concerning the termination; the options
such Members may have to join other health care service
plans ... or to switch to other providers as a result of the ter-
mination; or the fact that the provider will no longer be the
Member's health care provider.37
33. See id.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
36. See id.
37. AMA, Examples of Contract Clauses that Prohibit Physician-Patient Communications
196 [Vol. 7:187
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This gag provision prohibits physicians from discussing with a
patient other plans that might provide more complete coverage
for the patient's illness. Further, if a patient tells a physician
during his open-enrollment period that he wants to continue to
receive care from the physician and would change HMOs to
remain under the physician's care, the physician cannot dis-
close to the patient whether or not her (meaning the
physician's contract) has been renewed. This clause robs pa-
tients of the opportunity to switch plans if they wish to remain
with a particular physician, yet enables HMOs to change their
enrollees' physicians without notice. Quite clearly, from both
patients' and physicians' perspectives, gag clauses create medi-
cal and ethical problems.
2. From the HMO's Perspective
Representatives of HMOs describe the clauses in
physicians' contracts not as "gag" provisions which unlawfully
restrict physicians from disclosing information to their patients,
but rather as "confidentiality clauses" which protect proprietary
information from competitors." HMO representatives also
argue that the restrictions are intended to protect trade secrets
from competing HMOs.39 Defenders of the clauses further
maintain that "almost all, if not all, managed care firms have
confidentiality clauses."'
Moreover, HMO representatives assert that these clauses
are essential to help health plans build "a physician network of
cooperative team players."4 For example, they declare that
confidentiality clauses urge physicians to take any criticisms
(1996) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
38. See Kreier, supra note 28, at 5.
39. See Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O.'s Limit What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y.
TImms, Dec. 21, 1995, at Al. "The trick is to expose the incentives that payment schemes provide
doctors without revealing precise dollar amounts. If disclosure goes too far, and precise contracts
are made public, then plans will lose the power to bargain for discounted fees with individual
physicians." H.M.O. Gag Rules, supra note 26, at 18.
40. Kreier, supra note 28, at 5. "It's something the attorneys put in, no matter if it's health
care or a maker of widgets." Id. (Both these statements were made by John Kaegi, a spokesperson
for ChoiceCare of Long Island, a 163,000-member HMO). It seems ironic that one of the HMOs
major arguments for the existence of these clauses is as weak as stating everyone does it, so
therefore, it must be fine.
41. Id.
19971
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that they have about their HMO through proper administrative
channels. In other words, advocates believe that these clauses
encourage physicians to take their complaints to management
rather than to their patients.4 2 Thus, advocates insist that these
clauses prevent patients from being placed in the middle of
economic disputes between doctors and managed care organi-
zations. Furthermore, advocates stress that confidentiality claus-
es do not prevent physicians from filing complaints with regu-
latory agencies if the HMO's administration is not receptive."3
In short, HMO representatives assert that these clauses merely
provide a structured and insulated framework for grievances.
Supporters further state that few doctors are so dissatisfied
with confidentiality clauses that they refuse to sign their con-
tracts." In addition, supporters assert that "doctors are misrep-
resenting what the state of the world is" and that "[doctors]
have to decide whether [they want] to put their wallets ahead
of their patients."'4  Finally, advocates maintain that,
"[p]hysicians are not used to being a part of a broader organi-
zation" and "[t]hat's one of the challenges the medical commu-
nity is going to have to face."'
42. See id. Cincinnati ChoiceCare President Daniel Gregorie, M.D., analogizes confiden-
tiality clauses in physician contracts to contracts between non-medical companies and their
employees: "Proctor and Gamble or G.E. would not look too kindly on someone who was a
consultant for the company or working for the company if they publicly badmouthed the
company." Id.
I disagree, as will be discussed infra due to the sensitivity of the fiduciary relationship be-
tween a physician and a patient. See also Maurice Bernstein, M.D., e-mail letter (Feb. 3, 1996)
<http://www-hsc.usc.edul-mbemste>, (printed copy on file with author). Physicians have the re-
sponsibility, "without 'gag' rules, to avoid telling the patient unsubstantiated information about
their plan as facts or exaggerate the real facts with inflammatory rhetoric. We should be as
straightforeword [sic] and accurate in talking with patients about their medical plans as we would
want to be in discussing their medical illness." Id.
43. See ChoiceCare to Docs: Hush!, supra note 28, at Al.
44. See id. Again, this statement is extremely weak as it does not take into consideration
the realities of the health care market discussed supra, where physicians are increasingly
dependent on managed care organizations for the majority of their patients. See Gray, supra note
16, at 50. Dr. David Himmelstein states that he found a gag provision in his U.S. Healthcare con-
tract "so obnoxious I crossed it out." Id. See also Physicians Have Criticized Latest Contract With
ChoiceCare, supra note 28, at Fl. "Others noticed [the gag clause], but signed the contract
anyway because they felt they could not afford to lose their ChoiceCare patients." Id.
45. Alison Bass, Therapists Say Insurer Gag Order Hurts Patients: Health Professionals
Tell of a Blacklist, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1995, at Metro 1. This statement seems to undermine
the very argument HMOs are purporting to make: this advocate is acknowledging the conflict of
interest that physicians face when they have to decide whether their own financial interests should
prevail over quality of care to patients.
46. ChoiceCare to Docs: Hush!, supra note 28, at Al.
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The immense outrage caused by the publicizing of gag
clauses suggests that advocates of "confidentiality clauses" may
be fighting a losing battle. 7 Physicians should not have to
compromise their medical practices to participate in a managed
care system, but rather, managed care entities will have to
refocus their perception of delivering care in a cost-effective
system.
II. GAG PROVISIONS: VIOLATIONS OF THE
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
The practice of medicine is described as a moral-technical
profession.' While medicine is strongly rooted in science and
technology, the moral basis of medicine arises from the follow-
ing characteristics: first, medicine is directed at the welfare of
patients;49 second, its primary tenets are to "do good and
avoid harm;"' ' third, medical care rests on the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient." These characteristics encompass
the contractual and fiduciary foundations of the doctor-patient
relationship. The enforcement of gag provisions undermines
these firmly rooted foundations of ethics and law.
A. Background: The Doctor-Patient Relationship
1. Foundations in Contract Law
A physician's duty to a patient arises from the mutual
assent of both parties.52 A physician, therefore, has no duty to
aid a person in peril, unless the physician has a previously
established relationship with that individual.53 The doctor-pa-
47. See, e.g., Robert Kazel & Michael Schachner, HMOs Under Attack for 'Gag' Clauses:
Plans Contend the Problem is Overblown, Bus. INS., Feb. 12, 1996, at 1. "Now HMOs are
coming under fire from state legislatures and local and national doctors' organizations, which
maintain that any attempt by an HMO to map out what a doctor can say to patients represents a
threat to health care quality and the privileged doctor/patient relationship." Id.
48. See Cassell, supra note 22, at 771.
49. See id. (defining "welfare" as the conception of "the good and the right").
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977). The doctor-patient
relationship "springs from a consensual transaction, a contract, express or implied, general or
special ...." Id.
53. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (finding no duty to
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tient relationship constitutes a contract, whether express or
implied, and the rights and duties of the parties are governed
by contract law.54 However, due to the essential inequality of
the parties with respect to the subject matter of the contract,
the physician's duty to a patient extends beyond that which
parties in commercial contracts owe each other.5 Common
law rejects a purely contractual description of the physician-
patient relationship.. Therefore, to further protect the patient,
non-negotiable tort and fiduciary duties are imposed on the
physician. 6
2. Foundations in Tort Law
Once established, the relationship between a physician and
a patient is governed by the ethics of the medical profession57
and by the rules of statutory and common law. The duty of
care a physician owes a patient is governed by tort principles.
A physician risks medical malpractice liability if she fails to
provide the care to a patient that a reasonable physician under
the same circumstances would provide, even if the physician is
prevented from providing reasonable care by limited resourc-
es. 58 Moreover, once the physician-patient relationship is es-
provide care even if refusing to do so will cause death).
54. See Halle Fine Terrion, Note, Informed Choice: Physicians' Duty to Disclose
Nonreadily Available Alternatives, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 491,509 (1993) (examining duty of
physicians to disclose nonreadily available alternatives to patients under fiduciary and informed
consent doctrines).
55. See Terrion, supra note 54, at 509; Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 539, 541 (1949) (discussing the principles behind fiduciary relationships).
56. See Scott, supra note 55, at 540.
57. See Ralph Crawshaw et al., Patient-Physician Covenant, 273 JAMA 1553, 1553
(1995). "Medicine is, at its center, a moral enterprise grounded in a covenant of trust. This
covenant obliges physicians to be competent and to use their competence in the patient's best
interests. Physicians, therefore, are both intellectually and morally obligated to act as advocates
for the sick .... Id. See also Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath, Text, Translation, and
Interpretation, 1 BULL. HST. MED. 1, 3 (1943); AMA Ethics, supra note 16, at 333 (reiterating
the physician's commitment to patient welfare first).
58. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 352 (1993) (discussing the extent to
which physicians are required to furnish access to health care regardless of resource constraints);
Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons
for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302 (1994) [hereinafter Medical
Malpractice Law]. See also Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 671 (Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that a physician who complies without protest to limitations imposed by a third-party
payor cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for patient's care if the care provided is unreasonable);
Wilson v. Blue Cross, 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 663-666 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the Wickline
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tablished, the skill and care required of a physician cannot be
proportional to his expectation of pecuniary recompense. 9 Ef-
forts in managed care to contain health care costs by forcing
physicians to take into account economic concerns undercuts
the notion that physicians have sole authority to define appro-
priate health care outcomes for society and, therefore, should
be ultimately liable.' ° Thus, case law is emerging that extends
liability to the managed care entity which governs physicians'
actions. These cases have been brought under theories of vicar-
ious liability,6 direct corporate liability for negligent selec-
tion" and utilization management,' breach of warranty,'misrepresentation," and bad faith.'
holding in a situation where patient committed suicide after an early discharge from hospital).
59. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (1891). "Whether a patient be a pauper or a
millionaire, whether he be treated gratuitously or for reward, the physician owes him precisely the
same measure of duty, and the same degree of skill and care." Id. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 Cmt. (d) (1965) (stating that fiduciary may have to risk a loss of
compensation to fulfill his duty to his patient); Mehlman, supra note 58, at 371 (stating that if a
patient can show that the care was denied solely to increase the physician's income, the physician
will be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty to the patient). But see Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med.
Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating it was proper to exclude that profit
motivation may have caused an HMO physician to fail to hospitalize a patient with pregnancy
complications, observing that, "this evidence was only marginally relevant [to malpractice] and
potentially very prejudicial."), rev'd en banc 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1989).
60. See Medical Malpractice Law, supra note 58, at 1302.
61. See, e.g., Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868-69 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(stating that an HMO can be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior), cert. denied,
611 A.2d 657 (NJ. 1992); Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding an HMO vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician who was brought in
as an outside consultant by the HMO's physician, even though the consulting physician was not
an HMO participant); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. CL
1988) (reversing summary judgment for an HMO to allow consideration of the theory of
ostensible agency which would allow the HMO to be held vicariously liable for physician's
actions); Sloan v. Metro. Health, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding a staff
model HMO in Indiana liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent acts of a
participating physician). But see, e.g., Raglin v. HMO, 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding that the physicians who worked for the medical group that contracted with the HMO
were independent contractors and therefore, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply).
62. See, e.g., McClellan v. H.M.O., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (determin-
ing that the theory of corporate negligence could be extended to determine whether such HMOs
have a non-delegable duty to select and retain only competent primary care physicians).
63. See, e.g., Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670 (recognizing that in certain instances the third-
party payor can be held liable in the utilization review process where there is a wrongful
withholding of payment); Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (explaining that the test for joint tort
liability applied).
64. See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that a breach of warranty claim was unsuccessful in the instant case because the
HMO did not clearly and unequivocally warrant that a course of treatment recommended would
produce a certain result).
65. See, e.g., McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1060-61 (stating that an HMO may be liable for false
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3. Foundations in Fiduciary Law
As well as encompassing contract and tort law principles,
the physician-patient relationship also has foundations in fidu-
ciary law. Most courts recognize the fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship.67 A fiduciary is defined as "[a]
person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primar-
ily for another's benefit in matters connected with such under-
taking.' ' 68 Fiduciary duties are implied in the doctor-patient
relationship due to the high degree of trust and loyalty man-
dated by the relationship.69 Furthermore, this element is im-
plied because a physician traditionally possesses superior
knowledge of medical diagnoses and services." Finally, once
representation because it knew the public would rely on advertising to its detriment).
66. See, e.g., Williams v. HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(analogizing a bad faith action against an HMO with bad faith claims against insurers).
67. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating
that society has an established and beneficial interest in the fiduciary quality of the patient-
physician relationship); Mull v. String, 448 So. 2d 952,953 (Ala. 1984) (recognizing the concept
of physician's fiduciary duty); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1981)
(stating that the fiduciary relationship is one of trust and confidence); Woolley v. Henderson, 418
A.2d 1123, 1128 n.3 (Me. 1980) (stating that the historical underpinnings of the doctrine of
informed consent are frequently attributed to the fiduciary quality of the physician-patient
relationship); Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 653-654 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that a
physician is required to exercise the utmost good faith towards a patient), rev'd on other grounds,
520 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1974); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1972) (defining fully informed
consent as "raising an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length transactions");
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that the patient's trust in the
physician creates obligations); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102, (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (stating that it is axiomatic that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one);
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (finding of fiduciary qualities in physician-
patient relationship).
68. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 148 (1995). "The willingness of patients to turn to physicians for care, to
speak openly about intimate and potentially embarrassing information, and to rely on their
physicians' recommendations depends in large part on the ability of patients to trust that physi-
cians are acting primarily to advance the interests of their patients." Id. See also Anne T. Corrigan,
Note, A Paper Tiger: Lawsuits Against Doctors for Non-Disclosure of Economic Interests in
Patients' Cells, Tissues and Organs, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 565, 572 (1992) (discussing the
high degree of trust required in fiduciary relationships).
Some commentators have noted that the trust between patients and physicians has
deteriorated. But see Orentlicher, supra at 148 n.16 citing Leslie McAneny, Honesty and Ethics
Poll: Pharmacists Retain Wide Lead as Most Honorable Profession, L.A. TIMES SYNDICATE, July
29, 1993, available in Gallup Poll News Service (stating that surveys by the Gallup Poll taken
over the last fifteen years have consistently found that the public has greater trust in physicians
than most other professionals).
70. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.14. "Patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the
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patients are disabled by an illness, in addition to lacking medi-
cal knowledge, they may be unable to educate themselves
about their medical conditions and options.7!' Thus, the duties
imposed on physicians by their fiduciary status helps to mini-
mize the extreme differences in their bargaining power with
that of patients.
B. Enforcement of Gag Provisions Creates an Unlawful
Conflict of Interest for Physicians
Conflicts of interest for fiduciaries are not new to the
medical arena.72 The law acknowledges the likelihood of these
conflicts, and therefore, attempts to fashion preventive rules for
fiduciaries. Though the existence and enforcement of gag pro-
visions creates a conflict for physicians that the law has not
specifically dealt with before, general conflict-of-interest prin-
ciples, for the most part, can be applied.
Gag provisions force physicians to place their employment
status in jeopardy in order to provide necessary services or
information to their patients. Furthermore, because most physi-
cian-HMO contracts are terminable at-will, physicians are not
entitled to any explanation for their discharge. Thus, physicians
must either compromise the quality of care they offer to pa-
tients or lose their jobs and patients for not doing so. This
conflict of interest creates a dilemma in the delivery of health
care and one that must be eliminated.
Gag provisions create a conflict of interest that is unlaw-
ful; however, it sometimes may be difficult to determine
whether a physician is acting out of self-interest or for the
good of a particular patient.73 Though physicians have wide
medical sciences ... [and] it is only in the unusual case that a court could safely assume that the
patient's insights were on a parity with those of the treating physician." Id.
71. See Orentlicher, supra note 69, at 147.
72. See discussion supra about incentives created by fee-for-service payment systems as
compared with capitated systems.
73. See Cassell, supra note 22, at 772. "One cannot know directly whether or not the
patient's interest and fidelity are dominating the medical enterprise at any given moment." Id. at
772. See also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 807-09 (1983) [hereinafter
Fiduciary Law]. "[lit is difficult or impossible to eliminate the fiduciary's ability to use the power
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latitudes about treatment options, the authorization of tests, and
the recommendation of procedures, gag provisions accentuate
the conflict between patients' needs and the personal financial
interests of physicians by mandating that physicians act a cer-
tain way. Gag clauses prohibit a physician from recommending
treatments that are not offered by the patient's particular HMO.
Thus, gag clauses often force physicians to view procedures
that they once considered necessary, as elective; 4 compel
physicians to delay or completely omit tests and procedures;75
and finally, mandate that general practitioners assume responsi-
bility for care that should be referred to specialists.76
Careful observers of medical practice agree that the quali-
ty of medical performance is often "context-dependent." '  In
environments where a physician is rewarded for proper and
moral medical behavior, physicians will make the "right" medi-
cal decisions even when that conflicts with their personal
needs.78 Likewise, in an atmosphere where high medical stan-
dards either are not rewarded, or are actively discouraged,
physicians are more inclined to make "incorrect" medical deci-
sions.79 The enforcement of gag provisions has created an en-
vironment which fosters the financial interest of IIMOs' at the
expense of patient care. Thus, if gag clauses or protocols are
permitted to continue, either explicitly in physician contracts or
for another purpose to the detriment of the entrustor." Id. at 809.
74. See, e.g., Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44, 47. David
Robinson, a primary-care physician, states that "[h]e would request what he believed were
necessary tests and referrals, only to have them countermanded by utilization review managers.
He recalls requesting a CAT scan for a boy who had experienced seizures and occasional losses of
consciousness, possible warnings of a brain tumor, only to have his request denied." Robinson
grew so dissatisfied that he left the practice resolving only to see fee-for-service patients. Id.
75. Dr. Jones, of Colorado, is convinced that "women who once would have come to him
for a transplant aren't coming because their doctors, operating under tight managed-care cost
guidelines, aren't telling them that transplants are a medical option." Id. at 48.
76. See, e.g., Carley Christie story discussed supra at notes 1-3 and accompanying text. For
a general discussion of incentives for physicians to limit care refer to Alan A. Hillman et al., How
Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of
Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 86 (1989). Keep in mind,
however, that incentives are very different from gag provisions which are absolute mandates.
77. Cassell, supra note 22, at 774 n.3 and accompanying text, citing Quantity, Quality, and
Cost of Medical and Hospital Care Secured by a Sample of Teamster Family Members in New
York City (1962) and A Study of the Quality of Hospital Care Secured by a Sample of Teamster
Family Members in New York City (1964) (both studies published by Columbia University School
of Public Health and Administrative Medicine).
78. Id.
79. See id.
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implicitly in practice, they will destroy the delivery of quality
medical care by forcing physicians to make "incorrect" medical
decisions."
Commentators contend that a conflict of interest between a
physician and a patient need not terminate a fiduciary relation-
ship if there is full disclosure of the conflict to the principal."
However, this legal premise cannot hold true with gag provi-
sions because the exact substance of gag clauses prevents full
disclosure to patients. Thus, as gag provisions not only prevent
physicians from disclosing medically necessary information to
their patients, but also prevent physicians from disclosing that
they are being "gagged," traditional conflict-of-interest princi-
ples cannot ensure or protect the relationship.
Finally, protective mechanisms in the fiduciary relation-
ship that should prevent physicians from compromising quality
of medical care due to a conflict of interest (with or without
the existence of gag provisions) cannot stand up to an HMO's
threat of termination without cause. 2 If physicians are not
80. The Court in Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672, seemed to foreshadow the existence of
gag provisions by stating "it is essential that cost limitation programs not be permitted to corrupt
medical judgment."
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1957) (asserting that disclosure is re-
quired in a principal-agent relationship to prevent the violation of an agent's duty to the principal);
Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693,759 (1994). "While
undisclosed or extremely corrupting conflicts may be prohibited outright, properly informed
insurance subscribers may rationally agree to strategically crafted incentives which better induce
doctors to act as both medical treatment and economic purchasing agents for their patients." Id.
But see Hall, supra n. 38, citing with disapproval MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND
MORA.s: PHYSICIANS' CoNFuicrs OF INTEREST 156-62 (1993) (arguing that the protective
mechanisms inherent in fiduciary relationship are not present in the physician-patient relationship
and, therefore, even full disclosure of a conflict of interest is not enough). See also Marc A.
Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1405, 1407 (1989) (discussing strict prohibitions against conflict of interest that apply to
government officials).
82. First, courts prohibit, supervise, or limit self-dealing. Furthermore, if an agent self-deals
with the principal's consent, the law imposes a duty on him to act fairly and to disclose to the
principal all material information. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1957).
Second, the law prohibits the fiduciary from using his superior power to take advantage of the
principal. See generally Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of
Interest in the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 42 MERCER L. REv. 989 (1991). Third, courts may remove a disloyal fiduciary when
the structure of the relation is not compatible with his removal by the entrustor. See generally
Fiduciary Law, supra note 73, at 805-06. Finally, because courts impose such a high standard on
fiduciaries, it seems likely that punitive damages may be imposed on the fiduciary for breach of
the relationship. Cf id. at 830 (stating that courts impose a high standard on fiduciary and even
incorporate morality into fiduciary law).
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entitled to have their voices heard after termination and an
HMO does not have to premise termination on a valid, legal
explanation, then nothing from preventing malpractice liability
to upholding their Hippocratic Oath will provide physicians
with a valid defense to their termination. Part IV, discussed
infra, will propose possible solutions to this impasse.
C. Gag Provisions Prevent Physicians from Providing their
Patients with Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent is based on the per-
ceived right of a patient to exercise control over his own body
by deciding whether to submit to a particular treatment, 3 on
the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship, 4 and on
the principles of medical ethics. For patients, the doctrine of
informed consent is the guardian of individualism:
[I]t protects the patient's right to determine his own destiny in
medical matters; ... it guards against overreaching on the part
of the physician; it protects his physical and psychic integrity
and thus his privacy; and it compensates him both for affronts
to his dignity and for the untoward consequences of medical
care.
86
The doctrine of informed consent has its origins in the com-
mon law battery action which establishes civil liability for
83. Judge Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... Schloendlorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).
84. See, e.g., Carter v. Hoblit, 755 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Alaska 1988) (stating that "fraud can
be established by silence or nondisclosure when a fiduciary relationship exists between the par-
ties .... The fiduciary has a duty to fully disclose information which might affect the other
person's rights and influence his action"); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 862 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (finding that the fiduciary duty of the physician requires disclosure), affd 530 P.2d 334
(Wash. 1975); Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(stating "in the fiducial qualities of [the doctor-patient] relationship the physician's duty [is] to
reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he should know").
85. It is essential to note that although the AMA is extremely influential in the medical
arena, its statements on medical ethics are not legally binding. See generally In re AMA, 114
F.T.C. 575 (1991).
86. Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance
Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIs. L. REv. 413, 414-12 (1979).
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unauthorized treatment. 7 Over time, the doctrine of informed
consent has greatly expanded in scope.88
Informed consent" requires a physician to explain the
proposed procedure to a patient and to warn him of any materi-
al risks inherent in the treatment so that the patient can make
an intelligent decision to undergo the procedure.' ° The duty
requires disclosure of the nature of the medical problem and
the proposed treatment,9 including the proposed treatment's
risks and benefits, its probability of success,92 and alternative
methods of treatment.93 However, a physician does not have a
duty to provide informed consent when a "patient is uncon-
scious or otherwise incapable of consenting, and harm from a
failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened
by the proposed treatment" '94 or when communication of the
information would be a threat to the patient's well-being. Fi-
nally, the law recognizes the doctrine of informed consent as a
vehicle by which patients can determine whether a physician's
medical recommendation is clouded by personal motive.96 Due
87. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 563 (1l. 1906) (holding that liability was based
on "trespass to the person"); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (holding that a
physician's unauthorized examination and surgery of patient's ear was a "technical assault and
battery").
88. Informed consent cases are primarily viewed as negligence actions rather than
intentional torts; therefore, courts require patients to show actual harm rather than just the
dignitary harm of non-consented touching. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
89. The issue of patients' rights to actually comprehend medical information beyond their
right of informed consent is outside the scope of this Note. However, it is interesting to note that
Canterbury dismisses patient comprehension by stating, "the focus... is more properly upon the
nature and content of the physician's divulgence than the patient's understanding or consent."
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15. For discussion of this issue refer to Ladonna L. Griffith,
Comment, Informed Consent: Patient's Right to Comprehend, 27 How. LJ. 975, 989 nn.83-89
and accompanying text (1984).
90. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 773 (defining informed consent).
91. See, e.g., Harwell v. Pittman, 428 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that
patient's consent was invalid because the physician underwent gallbladder surgery without any
discussion of test results or the proposed surgery).
92. See, e.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 119 (Haw. 1970) (identifying rule requiring
physicians to inform patients of risks, benefits, outcomes, and alternatives for treatments).
93. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977) (stating that advising patients
of alternative methods of treatment is a component of informed consent).
94. See, e.g., Eis v. Chesnut, 627 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1981) (precluding summary
judgment where a physician obtained the consent of the patient's daughter, but not the patient,
before performing a second leg operation).
95. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (recognizing that patients occasionally become so ill
or emotionally distraught as to prohibit the making of a rational decision).
96. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.9 (Cal. 1990)
(stating that a physician's duty to disclose a personal interest may depend on the materiality of
1997]
208 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 7:187
to the inherent imbalance in the degree of knowledge and
understanding of patients and physicians,97 it is unlikely that a
patient would be able to waive his right to receive informed
consent. 98
The AMA recognizes the importance of the doctrine of
informed consent in medical practice and has enumerated sev-
eral of its components in a report entitled "Ethical Issues in
Managed Care."" Additionally, the AMA specifically address-
es the impact of gag clauses on informed consent and mandates
that physicians disclose all treatment alternatives to patients,
including those not offered by the patients' managed care
plans."° Likewise, the AMA mandates that physicians or plan
administrators fully disclose to patients any incentives phy-
sicians are given to limit care."' Moreover, the AMA specif-
that interest to the physician's recommendation of a particular medical procedure); Magan Med.
Clinic v. Cal. Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating that "a sick
patient deserves to be free of any reasonable suspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by
a profit motive").
97. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (stating "[tihe average patient has little or no
understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for
enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision").
98. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 365, 414-15 (1990) (discussing the
ramifications of a patient's decision to waive her right to receive information regarding the risks
and benefits of proposed treatment). But see Meisel, supra note 86, at 453-60 (discussing the
waiver exception to informed consent). In addition, courts have, virtually without exception,
rejected the position that patients and physicians should be permitted to bargain over the terms of
their relationship. See, e.g., Tunkel v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441 (Cal. 1963)
(rejecting an agreement between a patient and a hospital which released hospital from liability).
99. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMA, EmICAL ISSUES IN
MANAGED CARE (1994) (on file with author). Guideline 2(f) states:
Physicians also should continue to promote full disclosure to patients enrolled in
managed care organizations. The physician's obligation to disclose treatment
alternatives.., is not altered by any limitations in the coverage provided by the
patient's managed care plan. Full disclosure includes informing patients of all their
treatment options, even those that may not be covered under the terms of the managed
care plan.
100. See id. at 4-5. This statement has support in common law. Physicians are obligated to
inform patients about the possibility of obtaining care from another provider when the original
physician lacks sufficient skill to render reasonable care. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 739
F.2d 1502, 1503 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a physician is liable for not suggesting referral to
gastroenterologist); Moore v. Preventive Med. Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 728, 734 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (stating that an internist is liable if he fails to disclose information necessary to allow
patient to decide whether to go to a specialist).
101. ETHICAL ISSUES IN MANAGED CARE, supra note 99, at Guideline 3 states the following:
When physicians are employed or reimbursed by managed care plans that offer
financial incentives to limit care, serious potential conflicts are created between the
physicians' personal financial interests and the needs of their patients .... Any
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ically addresses the role of physicians employed by managed
care entities and states that the requirement of informed con-
sent remains with the physician."e Finally, the AMA stresses
that the doctrine of informed consent has a dual function: while
physicians have a duty to present the medical facts accurately
to patients, in turn, patients have the duty to educate them-
selves so that they can exercise their right to make their own
determinations about medical treatment. 3
Specifically addressing the existence of gag provisions in
provider contracts, then-AMA President Lonnie R. Bristow,
M.D., declared: "AMA physicians cannot abide by gag claus-
es."' °4 Further, in January 1996, the AMA Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs released the following statement on gag
clauses:
Patients cannot be subject to making decisions with inadequate
information. That would be an absolute violation of the in-
formed consent requirements. If these [gag] clauses are carried
out and the physicians are subject to sanction, a reduction in
the quality of patient care will result."5
This statement summarizes the ramifications of the issue at
hand, but does not offer any pragmatic recommendations or
solutions.
Furthermore, although the AMA's statement that gag
clauses violate informed consent requirements is inherently
valid, it does not clearly enumerate how courts should deter-
mine whether the duty has been breached. The relevant legal
inquiry regarding whether there has been a violation of a
patient's right to informed consent is a two-step analysis: first,
would the patient have consented to treatment had the physi-
cian adequately disclosed the material risks, benefits, and alter-
incentives to limit care must be disclosed fully to patients by plan administrators on
enrollment and at least annually thereafter.
102. Id. at Guideline 2f. Guideline 2(e) states: "Managed care plans must adhere to the
requirement of informed consent that patients be given full disclosure of material information.
Full disclosure requires that managed care plans inform potential subscribers of limitations or
restrictions on the benefits package when they are considering entering the plan." Id.
103. Id. (stating in Guideline 2(f) that physician's have an obligation to inform patients of all
treatment options and patients may decide if they want to seek care outside the plan for treatment
not covered).
104. AMA Calls to Cancel Gag Clauses, supra note 25.
105. Background Information About "Gag" Clauses, supra note 4, at 3 (emphasis added).
2091997]
HEALTH MATRIX
natives"° and second, if the duty has been breached, was
nondisclosure the proximate cause of the patient's injury? 10 7
Thus, whether a particular gag provision in a physician's con-
tract has forced a physician to violate her duty of informed
consent must be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
because gag clauses often prevent physicians from disclosing
medically necessary treatment options and from disclosing
what payment system they are on, it is likely that by not dis-
closing this information, patients are making decisions that
they would not have made had they been fully informed. Gag
provisions must, therefore, be eliminated from physician-HMO
contracts in order to eliminate the possibility that a physician
may be prohibited from fully informing her patients.
1Il. STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
PROTECTIONS FOR PHYSICIANS WHO REFUSE
TO ABIDE BY GAG PROVISIONS AND ARE
SUBSEQUENTLY SUBJECT TO REPRISALS
Although gag clauses clearly create an unlawful conflict of
interest for physicians as well as prohibit physicians from
fulfilling their duty to fully inform patients, when combined
with the existence of termination-without-cause provisions,
physicians are placed in an odious position. If an HMO has the
power to terminate physicians for any reason, what HMO
really needs an explicit gag clause? Thus, some HMOs may
have gag-like protocols and policies that are inherent in their
utilization review systems, but are not explicitly apparent.
Therefore, the most important issue that must be addressed is
whether physicians have any legal recourse if their employment
is at-will and they refuse to abide by gag provisions or gag-like
protocols. The remainder of this Note will focus on this con-
cern and will conclude that present protections are not ade-
quate.
106. See Terrion, supra note 54, at 500-01. This first step may be resolved by applying one
of three different standards for disclosure: the professional standard, the reasonable patient
standard, or the subjective standard. For a more in-depth analysis of these three standards refer to
id. at 502-06. See also Griffith, supra note 89, at 977-83.
107. See Terrion, supra note 54, at 500-01.
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However, before analyzing existing common law and
statutory protections for whistle-blowers, it must be noted that
measuring the cost of retaliation discharge is an extremely
difficult process. The few physicians who have spoken out
against gag clauses and their subsequent discharge due to the
presence of these clauses may not adequately represent the
broad scope of this problem. In fact:
[T]he full cost of [the] uneven and half-hearted enforcement
of... freedom of speech cannot be measured since the content
of the lost speech is unknown. This much, however, is clear.
this cost should not be estimated by looking only at the per-
sonalities and the message of the handful of employees who
initiate lawsuits challenging their discipline on free speech
grounds."t s
This statement is particularly relevant when discussing physi-
cians who are gagged in the managed care context. As dis-
cussed previously, physicians are increasingly dependent on
HMOs for patients. Thus, the threat of deselection may be
great enough to prevent physicians from blowing the whistle,
especially when the decision not to provide care is in the gray
area of a medical opinion rather than a clear-cut case of medi-
cal malpractice. 9
A. Common Law Employment At-Will and its Public Policy
Exception
As recently as two decades ago, the law in almost every
state, regarding an employee's termination, was the same:"0
108. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 67 (1987). See also Cynthia L. Estnd, Free Speech and Due
Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. LJ. 101, 103 (1995). Estlund states the following:
Evidence for my contentions would be found not in the cases adjudicating claims
of retaliation, but in the silence that surrounds them - the silence of the typical
employee who is neither uncommonly brave nor litigious, whose job is crucially
important to her and her family, and who is guided in her actions by expectations
about the consequences of those actions.
Id.
109. This will be discussed in more detail infra footnotes 124-36 and accompanying text.
110. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & John W. Collins, Employee Attitudes Toward
Whistleblowing: Management and Public Policy Implications, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 939, 939-40
(1992) (reporting the results from a Syracuse University survey on trends in employee
termination). For a discussion of factors that contributed to an increase in wrongful termination
litigation in the 1980's refer to Susan R. Mendelsohn, Wrongful Termination Litigation in the
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unless an employee had an employment contract that stated
otherwise, an employee was an employee at-will, and could be
discharged at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at
all."' Today, some states refuse to deviate from the employ-
ment at-will doctrine; and therefore, in those states, a dis-
charged whistle-blower has no common law remedy.' 2
However, since the early 1980s the employment at-will
doctrine has been tremendously eroded by exception."3 For
example, the public policy exception has greatly expanded the
scope of recourse for whistle-blowers. Furthermore, a majority
of states have adopted it as a viable exception. 4 In a state
United States and Its Effect on the Employment Relationship, 3 LAB. MKT. & SOC. POL'Y
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1, 3-4 (1990).
111. See Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20 (stating that employee can be terminated"... for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong").
112. The following is a list of cases in alphabetical order by jurisdiction, where courts have
refused to recognize a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine: See, e.g., Jones
v. Ethridge, 497 So. 2d 1107, 1107 (Ala. 1986) (upholding the right of an employer to discharge
an employee because the employee refused to commit a crime); Ivy v. Army Times Publ'g Co.,
428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981) (denying a rehearing en banc where employer discharged employee for
truthful testimony adverse to employer); Evans v. Bibb Co., 342 S.E.2d 484, 484 (Ga. Ct. App.
1986) (reaffirming that Georgia has refused to adopt a public policy exception in case involving a
long-term disability claim); Kelly v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874, 875 (Miss. 1981)
(discharging employee for filing workers' compensation claim upheld); Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi
Trust Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (App. Div. 1989) (refusing to recognize a public policy
exception for employee who reported illegal activities because the employee did not allege any
violations of law that presented substantial and specific danger to public health or safety).
113. The themes justifying the exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine fall into three
categories: (1) implied consent, (2) public policy, and (3) duty of good faith and fair dealing.
However, the scope of this Note will only encompass the public policy exception. For an in-depth
discussion of the other exceptions, refer to Todd M. Smith, Note, Wrongful Discharge
Reexamined: The Crisis Matures. Ohio Responds, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1209, 1215 (1991)
(focusing on the employment at-will doctrine in Ohio, but this analysis is applicable elsewhere as
well).
114. Many states recognize a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine and
have indicated that the exception should be extended to whistle-blowers. The following is a list of
cases, in alphabetical order by jurisdiction, that demonstrate this extension: See, e.g., Vermillion
v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 704 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ariz. CL App. 1985) (recognizing a claim
for an employee allegedly dismissed for refusing to participate in theft); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Ox-
ford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 381-82 (Ark. 1988) (recognizing a public policy exception for employee
who blew the whistle on employer who was overcharging the government); Tameny v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1330 (Cal. 1980) (recognizing a public policy claim for an
employee who refused to engage in antitrust violations); Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Elec.
Ass'n., 765 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. CL App. 1988) (recognizing a claim for a public utility
employee who refused to testify untruthfully before regulatory commission); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (Conn. 1980) (recognizing a claim for an employee
who complained about food packaging violations); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d
625, 626 (Haw. 1982) (recognizing a claim for an employee who was discharged because of his
participation in an antitrust investigation); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879
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where the public policy exception has been adopted, an em-
ployee cannot be terminated for exposing an employer's
wrongdoing if it is a violation of public policy. Nevertheless,
because the public policy exception is often narrowly defined,
it does not seem to adequately protect employees from dis-
charge. Therefore, it is equally unlikely that physicians who at-
tempt to justify their whistle-blowing on public policy grounds
will be successful.
1. Background
It is difficult to precisely define what the public policy
exception encompasses because it varies tremendously from
state to state.'15 Some states base the exception on what the
state's legislature enumerates as public policy,"6 while others
base the definition on the state's constitution," 7 administra-
tive regulations,"' and in certain circumstances, professional
codes of ethics."9 Furthermore, some states adopt a broad
meaning to the exception, 2 ° whereas others hold that the pro-
tection is very narrow.' However, it is apparent that courts
have little difficulty defining the elusive term "public policy"
to encompass the reporting of criminal law violations and, by
extension, specifically enumerated civil law violations. 22 In
(Ill. 1981) (recognizing a claim for discharge due to aiding in the criminal investigation of a co-
worker); Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (recognizing a claim
for an employee who was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim).
115. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990) (defining public policy as
"[clommunity common sense and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state
to matter of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the like... having due regard to all
circumstances of each particular relation and situation").
116. See, e.g., Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 425.
117. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898-9 (3rd Cir. 1983).
118. See, e.g., Nye v. Dept. of Livestock, 639 P.2d 498,500 (Mont. 1982).
119. See generally Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505,512 (NJ. 1980) (discussing
professional ethics involving physician's refusal to continue controversial drug tests).
120. See, e.g., -inson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 552-53 (Okla. 1987) (holding that nurse
assistant's refusal to perform the order to give a patient an enema did not violate any of the public
policy grounds enumerated as follows: 1) refusing to participate in an illegal activity; 2) per-
forming an important public obligation; 3) exercising a legal right or interest; 4) exposing some
wrongdoing by an employer, and, 5) performing an act that public policy would encourage).
121. See Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1983) (stating
that an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when his employment is terminated
in violation of a legislature's express or implied expression of public policy).
122. See DANEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
87 (1991) (detailing state legislature's enactment of private sector whistle-blower protection stat-
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contrast, courts have difficulty including professional codes
within the public policy exception because a violation of these
codes may not be an indication of criminal wrongdoing. 23
Despite these inconsistencies, punitive damages may be award-
ed for termination due to reporting of a public policy excep-
tion. Thus, whistle-blowers who have suffered retaliation may
have a financial incentive to bring their claims using this com-
mon law exception." 4
2. The Gray Area of Medical Opinion: Protected by the
Public Policy Exception or Not?
The case of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corpora-
tion 5 is analogous to many of the issues that gag provisions
and terminable at-will employment have created. Just as many
physicians have at-will HMO contracts, in Pierce, a physician
was employed pursuant to an at-will relationship.2 6
Furthermore, the physician in Pierce was the only medical
person on a research team assigned with the responsibility of
testing drugs for pre-market approval. 7 This is analogous to
the situation where a physician, employed by an HMO, works
with nurse practitioners, but is the only individual with a medi-
cal degree treating a particular patient. Finally, the physician in
Pierce was pressured by decision-makers, who did not have
medical degrees, to make a decision that was financially bene-
ficial for the group, but that was contrary to her medical judg-
ment. Likewise, a physician employed by an HMO must often
get pre-approval from a utilization review committee that is
composed of non-physicians before she can treat or refer pa-
tients. These non-physician decision-makers may pressure phy-
sicians to act in accordance with the HMO's financial interests
as opposed to a patient's medical well-being.
utes).
123. As discussed previously, The Code of Ethics, promulgated by the AMA is not legally
binding. See In re AMA, 114 F.T.C. 575, 575 (1991).
124. See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 240 (1992)
(discussing whistle-blowing by employees and the results of such employee action).
125. See generally Pierce, 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980).
126. Id. at 506.
127. Id. at 506-07.
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The physician in Pierce refused to submit a drug contain-
ing a high level of saccharin for clinical testing because she
feared the drug's potential carcinogenic attributes." Dr.
Pierce based her decision in part on the fact that although the
drug was consistent with concentration standards in Europe, it
was unsuitable for use in the United States.'29 Therefore, Dr.
Pierce stated that to seek the Federal Food and Drug
Administration's permission for the high concentration of sac-
charin would be a violation of the Hippocratic Oath. 3 Since
Dr. Pierce's approval was necessary for the project and she
would not approve clinical testing of the drug, she was ter-
minated from the project.' Dr. Pierce alleged that it was
against public policy to terminate her solely because she would
not approve testing of a potentially controversial drug..
Though the court in Pierce recognized that professionals
owe a special duty to abide by federal and state law as well as
the recognized code of ethics of their profession,'32 the court
did not allow the physician's public policy claim to prevail.
The court stated that the controversy involved a difference of
medical opinions and that discharging an employee on that
basis was not a violation of clearly expressed public policy.'33
Furthermore, the court stated that because the plaintiff did not
allege that the drug testing was "dangerous" and only alleged it
was "controversial," her argument that the tests were a viola-
tion of the Hippocratic Oath was unfounded."' Thus, Dr.
Pierce's termination did not fit into the public policy exception,
and therefore, it was lawful.
The result in Pierce is troubling. Much of the practice of
medicine is based on medical opinions;35 therefore, to allow
a physician to be terminated based on a difference of medical
128. Id. at 507.
129. Id.
130. Id. The physician cited the part of the Oath that read: "I will prescribe regimen for the
good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone." Id.
at 513.
131. Id. at 507-08.
132. Id. at 512.
133. Id. at 514.
134. Id. at 514.
135. It is commonplace to get several medical opinions before deciding what course of
treatment to pursue with a medical problem.
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opinion provides HMOs with a large loophole. Though the
Pierce court acknowledged that a physician's termination due
to refusal to abide by practices which would result in medical
malpractice would be encompassed by the public policy excep-
tion,136 much of medical practice involves less clear medical
determinations. Using the Pierce court's rationale, it appears
that physicians with a contract that contains gag provisions or
gag-like protocols could be terminated for recommending treat-
ments or referrals that violate the explicit or unspoken gag lan-
guage. Just as Dr. Pierce was terminated without recourse for
voicing a medical opinion that was contrary to the financial
goals of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, likewise, a physi-
cian in an HMO could be terminated for voicing a medical
opinion that is contrary to an explicit or implied gag provision.
After all, the Pierce court implies that differences of opinions
are viable reasons for termination.
Using the Pierce court's rational and applying it to an at-
will HMO-physician contract that is coupled with the existence
of a gag provision, HMOs have an extremely strong argument
for lawful deselection. To prevail, an HMO would merely have
to illustrate the following: 1) that the physician's contract is
terminable at-will; 2) that the physician was deselected because
the parties differed in opinions of necessary care for a patient;
and, 3) that the physician refused to abide by the HMO's ser-
vice restrictions and therefore, violated a gag clause by reveal-
ing alternative services to the patient. 37 Thus, using the
Pierce court's rationale, it appears that the public policy excep-
tion does not provide physicians with adequate protection if
they recommend services that are based on medical opinion
and contrary to gag protocols.
136. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 511-12.
137. In fact, this is precisely the argument that U.S. Healthcare used when it deselected Dr.
Himmelstein from the HMO because he criticized the HMO's gag clauses. U.S. Healthcaxe stated,
"Given the fact that he has expressed a lack of comfort with us, we assumed that he no longer
wanted to participate and that he would have welcomed the notice that we provided to him." Gray,
supra note 16, at 50.
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B. Statutory Protections for At-Will Employees Who Blow
the Whistle on Unlawful Practices
Many states have whistle-blower protections that are in-
tended to protect employees from retaliation for refusing to
engage in unlawful activities.' Some states protect both pri-
vate and public employees,'39 some merely protect public em-
ployees,"4 and some states do not have any protection enu-
merated by statute. 4' Additionally, statutes vary in their defi-
nitions of employer wrongdoing, the procedure a whistle-
blower must follow to gain recourse, the damages awarded to
whistle-blowers, and the penalties imposed on wrongdoers.
Finally, if a state provides a statutory remedy for a whistle-
blower claim, some courts require that an employee invoke the
statutory remedy instead of the public policy common law
remedy. As will be discussed infra, due to the narrow defi-
nition state statutes usually apply to the term "wrongdoing,"
138. An at-length discussion of federal whistle-blower protections is beyond the scope of
this Note. For a general list of federal statutes that protect employees against reprisals, refer to
Estlund, supra note 108, at 117 nn.62-63.
139. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m(a)(2)-(3) (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 448.101(2)-(3)
(1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-61 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.2027(A)
(West 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 832(l)-(2) (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 17.428(2) (West 1996); MINN. STAT. § 181.931(1)(a) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-
E:I(I)-(ID (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-2(a)&(b) (West 1995); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(l)(a)-
(b) (Consol. 1996); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.51(A)-(B) (Anderson 1996).
140. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-531(1) (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115(a)(1)
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4(d) (1996); IOWA CODE § 70A.28(1)-(2) (1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-2973 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (Michie 1995); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 105.055 (1995); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1422 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-10(2) (Law. Co-
op. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-2(3)-(4)(a) (1996); W. VA. CODE § 6C-1-2(b)-(c) (1996);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.80(3)-(4) (1994).
141. As summarized in 12 TERMNATION OF EMPLOYMENT 120,031 (1996) the following
states do not have statutory enumerated whistle-blower protections: Arkansas, the District of
Columbia, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
142. "While illegal acts are most clear cut, employees also may act because they consider
the misdeed to be immoral, unethical, or simply beyond the purview of what an organization
legitimately can expect an employee to do." Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near,
Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working? 25 AM. BUS. L. J. 241, 244 (1987).
143. This may significantly decrease the damages that an employee is entitled to because
few statutes offer punitive damages and under the public policy exception, punitive damages are
often awarded. See, e.g., Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Mich. 1993)
(stating that punitive damages for wrongful discharge which is in violation of public policy are
only sustainable when there is no applicable statutory prohibition against retaliatory discharge for
the conduct at issue). But see, e.g., Greenwald v. N. Miami Beach, 587 F.2d 779, 781 (5th Cir.
1979) (stating that the federal remedies for whistle-blowers under the Safe Drinking Water Act
were entirely independent of any state or local remedies).
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the stringent statutory procedural requirements whistle-blowers
must follow, and the inadequate damages provided, statutory
whistle-blower protections are, for the most part, extremely
inadequate. Thus, it seems unlikely that state statutes will pro-
vide physicians with the protection they need to prevent unjust
retaliation for their refusal to obey gag provisions.
1. Background
In general, the scope of coverage for whistle-blowers
under state statutes is narrower than that which is protected
under common law theories.'" "Legislatures do not want to
leave much to the whistle-blower's discretion,"'45 and thus,
often limit reportable wrongdoing to those activities which
violate state, federal, or municipal law." Moreover, no state
statute that protects private employees has gone so far as to
protect whistle-blowers who complain about alleged violations
of ethical codes. 47 Many states also require that the violation
be "imminent"' or "substantial and specific."' 49  Finally,
most states require that the employee report the violation in
good faith and make an effort to reasonably investigate the
veracity of the allegation."
A similar lack of consensus exists between states regard-
ing procedural requirements for whistle-blowers. Some states
require that employees first report alleged violations internal-
ly,' while others require reports to be made externally.'
144. See MicCEu & NEAR, supra note 124, at 241 (stating that state statutes are no broader
and often are narrower than common law).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.2027(A)(1)
(West 1996).
147. See WESTMAN, supra note 122, at 71. But see, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1422 (1996)
which states that a public employee cannot discharge an employee who refused to participate in a
violation of federal, state, or local law, regulation, ordinance, code of conduct, or code of ethics.
148. See, e.g., 0Io REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (Anderson 1996).
149. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (Consol. 1996).
150. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (1994) (noting that employees who make false
reports of violations are subject to disciplinary action); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.2027(A) (West
1996).
151. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (West 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275-E:2(l) (1995). These statutes give employers the opportunity to correct the problem before
it becomes public knowledge.
152. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m(b) (1994) (stating that state employees may give
to a public body any information they have about violations of state law).
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Furthermore, some states will only recognize a claim if the
report of the alleged violation has first been made in writ-
ing.153 Lastly, most state statutes have very short statute of
limitations within which claims must be made. 54 The strin-
gent procedural requirements that state statutes impose on
whistle-blowers makes it difficult for whistle-blowers, even
those with valid claims, to receive recourse.'
Finally, the remedies and penalties provided by state stat-
utes may not make whistle-blowing worth an employee's ex-
pense, time, or energy. The most commonly provided remedies
are reinstatement, back pay, lost benefits, and injunctive re-
lief. 6  Only a few states allow discharged employees to
bring suit for damages."' To make matters worse, sanctions
against wrongdoers are minimal, usually not more than
$500.' This low monetary penalty provides no disincentive
for wrongdoers, and therefore, they continue to retaliate against
whistle-blowers.
2. Criticisms of Whistle-Blower Statutes
State legislatures passed existing whistle-blower protection
statutes with the hope that state-mandated protections would
encourage whistle-blowing.' 59 However, when compared to
states without statutory protection, enactment of whistle-blow-
ing statutes has not resulted in the increase of whistle-blower
claims. 6 ' Thus, it appears that state statutes are neither being
153. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 1995) (requiring an employee to submit
written notice of a violation to give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the
violation).
154. Statutes of limitations range from ninety days, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-
51m(c) (1994), to within two years, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 448.103(l)(a) (1995).
155. See, e.g., Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Ohio 1995) (stating that
employee must strictly comply with the dictates of the Ohio Revised Code to be afforded
protection as a whistle-blower).
156. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-107(c) (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-17(a)
(Michie 1995); MINN. STAT. § 181.935(a) (1995).
157. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.2027(B)(1) (West 1996) (allowing suit for treble
damages).
158. But see, e.g., M]NN. STAT. § 181.935(b) (1995) (allowing an employer to be fined up to
$750 per employee who is injured due to the employer's failure to inform the employee of a
violation).
159. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 142, at 253 & 258-59 (discussing several whistle-
blowing statutes).
160. Id. at 254. However, studies also show that there has been an increase in whistle-
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interpreted in a way that offers maximum protection to whistle-
blowers, nor are drafted to best protect whistle-blowers and
encourage the reporting of malfeasance.
There are several explanations for why state whistle-blow-
ing statutes have not increased the incidence of whistle-blow-
ing. First, widespread ignorance of the law combined with
what is typically a very short statute of limitations precludes
many claims before they are even recognized. 6' Second, the
risks of whistle-blowing and the motivations behind it out-
weigh statutory protection and compensation. 62 For example,
the remedies presently offered, particularly back pay and rein-
statement, do not compensate an employee for the emotional
and physical upheaval associated with unemployment, the
branding as a traitor by co-workers, and the expense associated
with pursuing a lawsuit. 63 However, if statutes would rou-
tinely award compensatory damages for emotional distress or
punitive damages to sanction wrongdoers, the incentive for
whistle-blowing would increase." A final possible expla-
nation for why more whistle-blower suits have not been
brought following the enactment of state statutes is that compa-
nies are no longer retaliating against whistle-blowers. 65
However, this explanation does not seem likely in light of two
recent studies on retaliatory actions."6
One must address the following two questions to deter-
mine whether statutory enactments adequately protect employ-
blower claims generally. See id. at footnotes 166-79 and accompanying text.
161. See Micau & NEAR, supra note 124, at 235. "[It is only the extremely knowledgeable
or aggressive employees who will realize that they have a claim and [will] be motivated to act
within that time frame." Id.
162. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 142, at 260.
163. See id. at 262.
164. See id
165. See id. at 263.
166. A survey of 276 people was performed in Syracuse, New York. (55.2% of those given
questionnaires, participated in the survey). This survey found the following: (1) recognition by
employees of a hierarchy of proper whistle-blower outlets: internal first, law enforcement
agencies second, and news media last; (2) less employee support for legal protection for whistle-
blowers who report unethical activities than for those who report illegal conduct; (3) very strong
overall support for legal protection of whistle-blowers, even among managerial and supervisory
employees; (4) a belief among employees that a fear of being fired deters whistle-blowers. See
Callahan & Collins, supra note 110, at 940-41; U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
WIIISTLEBLOWING IN THE FEDERAL GovEmENT:. AN UPDATE (1992) [hereinafter 1992
UPDATE] (comparing a survey from 1992 with a 1983 survey of whistle-blowing in the federal
government and making recommendations for improvement).
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ees from reprisal: First, how prevalent is employer retaliation
against protected speech? Second, to what extent do employees
feel free of the threat of employer retaliation? The most de-
tailed answers to these questions are provided by the federal
government 67 whose employees are protected by both the
First Amendment and the 1989 Whistle-Blowing Protection
Act.'68 Thus, as federal employees are often referred to as
having greater job security than just about any other group of
employees, 69 this study raises serious concerns about free-
dom of expression in the private sector workplace where job
security may not be as great.
The government surveyed over thirteen-thousand employ-
ees1 70 and then compared the data with a similar study it had
performed in 1983.' On a positive note, the study revealed
that progress has been made towards encouraging employees to
blow the whistle.77 Furthermore, the study revealed that em-
ployees are most likely to report illegal activities when the
continuance of the wrongdoing endangers lives. 73 Applying
this statistic to physicians who are gagged from disclosing
treatments that are medically necessary, it is encouraging to
note that despite the existence of a gag clause, many physi-
cians would likely blow the whistle on the lack of adequate
care provided by HMOs.
However, the study also revealed that the number of em-
ployees who were victims of subtle reprisal, as contrasted with
outright employment termination, significantly increased. 74
167. See generally 1992 UPDATE, supra note 166.
168. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 STAT. 16-35 (codified
as amended 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989)) (guaranteeing rights and protection to federal employees who
disclose information regarding government illegality, waste, and corruption). However, one critic
of the Act stated, "protection under the Whistleblower [Protection] Act is a myth. I would not
encourage anyone to 'blow the whistle' on waste, fraud or abuse." 1992 UPDATE, supra note 166,
at 14.
169. See Estlund, supra note 108, at 120.
170. See 1992 UPDATE, supra note 166, at i.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 9-17. The study revealed that in 1983, 30% said they reported illegal or
wasteful activities whereas in 1992, 50% reported those activities. Id.
173. Id. at 9-11. The survey revealed that 96% of respondents said that this would be a very
important factor in encouraging them to report. Id. Of least importance was eligibility to receive
cash awards for reporting such activities. Id.
174. Id. at ii & 19-26. The study revealed that in 1983, 24% of those who reported illegal or
wasteful activity experienced actual or threatened retaliation, whereas in 1992 that figure had risen
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The most prevalent threat of reprisal that reporting employees
received was the threat of poor performance appraisal.'75
Therefore, this would prevent their advancement at work.
Additionally, the most commonly experienced reprisals report-
ed by employees were shunning by co-workers 176 and verbal
harassment. 7 It is disturbing that there was an increase in
subtle reprisals in 1992 because that rise represents a more
insidious strategy for retaliating against whistle-blowers and
one that present statutes do not provide protection from: pres-
ent statutes only accommodate individuals who have been ter-
minated from employment for their whistle-blowing activity.
Of those individuals who took actions against the subtle repri-
sals that they experienced, 78 forty-five percent said that it got
them in more trouble, and forty-four percent stated that it made
no difference. 179
All of these explanations suggest that "it is not the rarity
of employer reprisals, but rather weaknesses in the system of
enforcement - some combination of employee ignorance
about these provisions, inadequate agency resources, lack of
political will, and vagaries of proof - that have rendered
many statutory anti-retaliation provisions virtually dor-
mant."'8 Applying the federal government's statistics to phy-
sicians who are gagged by HMOs, it is likely that an increased
number of physicians will experience some sort of retaliation.
As present statutory and common law remedies are not ade-
quate to offer physicians protection, recommendations must be
to 37%. Id. at 21-22.
175. See id. at 19. The study revealed that 12% of those who reported reprisal stated that
poor performance reviews were the greatest threat. One individual who actually received a poor
performance review stated, "My manager was very careful not to do anything drastic. She was
being watched." Id. at 21.
176. See id. at 19 (revealing that 49% of employees were shunned by co-workers). One
individual stated, "I was a whistle-blower [years ago] and was banished to another work area
because of it. Management did not want to hear it then and does not want to hear it now. They can
(and do) punish you in a more subtle manner now than in years past." Id. at 22.
177. The study also revealed that 47% of employees who reported wasteful or illegal
activities were subject to verbal harassment. Id. at 19.
178. The study revealed that 68% complained to higher level agency management or some
other office within the agency. Id. at ii & 19.
179. See id. at 25.
180. Estlund, supra note 108, at 132.
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made to guide legislatures to make improvements. This is
precisely what I will attempt to do infra in Part IV.
C. Critique of Recently Passed and Pending Legislation
Designed to Specifically Deal With Gag Provisions and
Managed Care Organizations' Retaliation Against Physicians
Several states have attempted to deal with the existence of
gag provisions in physician-HMO contracts. Though the pro-
posals and implemented bills have placed the unethical and
unlawful practices of HMOs in the limelight, no proposal pro-
vides complete protection for physicians. A closer look at
several of these bills will shed light on their strengths and
deficiencies and will provide insight for my recommendations.
However, before turning to proposed state solutions to the
existence of gag provisions, a comment must be made about
the pending federal "Patient Right to Know Act."'' This bill
would prohibit restrictions on information physicians can pro-
vide to their patients.'82 Furthermore, health plans would be
prohibited from taking retaliatory action against physicians and
other health care providers for their discussions with
patients.8 3 Finally, health care plans that violate the terms of
the Act would face fines of $25,000.184
Though this federal act addresses many of the issues that
gag clauses coupled with at-will employment creates, I do not
believe that federal legislation will be passed quickly enough to
prevent short-term tragic results. Furthermore, gag clauses and
practices often have unique characteristics which vary from
HMO to HMO. Therefore, state legislatures are in a better
181. See Diane M. Gianelli, Federal Managed Care Bill Would Lift Gag, AM. MED. NEws,
Mar. 11, 1996, at 3.
182. See Gerry Clark, Gag Clauses' Restrict Options, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRIC NEws, Apr.
1996, at 1.
183. See id. "Examples of retaliatory action include: refusal to contract, termination of
contracts, refusal to refer patients, refusal to renew contracts, and refusal to compensate." Id.
184. See id. Repeat offenders could be fined $100,000. Id.
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position to investigate the particular gag policies and protocols
found in HMOs located in their jurisdiction and are in a better
position to immediately remedy the problem. Thus, though a
federal bill may be very effective in the long term, to meet the
short-term problems created by gag clauses, state legislatures
must take immediate action.
1. California
The California Medical Association first called attention to
the problem of gag clauses in 1995 summer legislative hear-
ings."' Subsequently, a draft amendment to Business and
Professions Code, section 2056.1 was promulgated to "prohibit
gag clauses" and to "provide protection against retaliation for
physicians who advocate for medically appropriate health care
for their patients."'86 Specifically, the amendment to sec-
tion 2056.1 includes the following statement:
No health care service plan ... shall prohibit or restrict any
medical provider from disclosing to any subscriber,.., any
information that such medical provider deems appropriate re-
garding the nature of treatment, risks or alternatives thereto, the
availability of other therapy, consultation, or test, the decision
of any plan to authorize or deny services, or the process the
plan or any person contracting with the plan uses, or proposes
to use, to authorize or deny health care services or benefits. Any
such prohibition or restriction contained in a contract with a
medical provider shall be void and unenforceable."
This amendment sufficiently touches upon many of the unlaw-
ful restrictions that gag provisions place on physicians, but
then merely states that such prohibitions are "void and unen-
forceable." Of course such restrictions are "void and unen-
forceable" because, as discussed previously, they create an
unlawful conflict of interest and violate a patient's right of
informed consent. Thus, the legislature does nothing more than
185. Memorandum from Kelly Kenny, Director, AMA Division of State Legislation, &
Carol O'Brien, Senior Attorney, AMA Health Law Division, to Executive Directors & State
Legislation Contacts of State Medical Societies and National Medical Specialty Societies (Jan. 22,
1996) (on file with author) (advising recipients of AMA press release about gag clauses in
managed care contracts).
186. Draft Amendment to California Business and Professions Code § 2056 to Prohibit
"Gag Clauses" (provided by the California Medical Association, on file with author).
187. Id. (emphasis added)
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reiterate a legal conclusion. It does not get to the heart of the
matter by imposing sanctions on HMOs caught with these
practices and it does nothing to ensure that physicians will not
be terminated for refusing to abide by such unlawful prohibi-
tions. In short, the amendment does not do what it purports to
do, i.e., "provide protections against retaliation." Thus, as a
pragmatic matter, this amendment will do nothing more than
remind physicians of the predicament they are in.
However, on January 12, 1996, Bill 2067 was proposed as
an addendum to section 1374.4 of the Health and Safety
Code."'88 This proposal takes a step in the correct direction re-
garding protection of at-will physicians from retaliatory dis-
charge. This proposed bill states that to terminate or penalize a
health care practitioner "for advocating for appropriate health
care" is a violation of public policy.89' If this bill is passed, it
will provide physicians with a public policy exception that is
explicitly defined and mandated by legislature. This proposal,
in essence, forbids discharge due to a difference in medical
opinions and gives physicians a strong foundation for a wrong-
ful discharge claim. Though providing a clear expression of
public policy gives physicians a foundation for a wrongful dis-
charge claim and that is certainly better than not addressing the
at-will issue at all, perhaps a better solution would be to man-
date due process by prohibiting at-will provider-HMO con-
tracts.' 90
In addition to providing a valid basis for the public policy
exception to at-will employment, this bill specifically prohibits
gag provisions. The bill states:
No ... plan shall discharge, discipline, demote, terminate a
contract with, or otherwise sanction, a physician and surgeon or
health care practitioner for advocating on behalf of a patient,
including, but not limited to, criticizing plan policies that deny,
limit, or restrict medical services. 91
Therefore, if this bill becomes law, it will prohibit physicians
from being terminated for expressing their medical opinions.
188. A.B. 2067, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
189. Id.
190. This will be more fully developed infra in Part IV with my recommendations.
191. A.B. 2067, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (emphasis added).
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This will hold true even if the opinions differ from that which
is offered by a patient's plan or if opinions are prohibited by a
gag clause.
2. Massachusetts
On January 19, 1996, Guenter L. Spanknebel, M.D., Presi-
dent of the Massachusetts Medical Society stated: "Massachu-
setts physicians will no longer need to fear retaliation from
commercial insurers and managed care plans for fulfilling their
duty as patient advocates."'' Dr. Spanknebel released that
statement because earlier that day Governor William Weld
signed into law House Bill 5347, the "Patient Confidentiality
Bill."'93 Dr. Spanknebel was excited about the following por-
tion of the bill:
A health maintenance organization shall not refuse to contract
with or compensate for covered services an otherwise eligible
provider solely because such provider has in good faith commu-
nicated with one or more of his current, former or prospective
patients regarding the provisions, terms or requirements of the
organization's products as they relate to the needs of such
provider's patients.'94
The purpose of this bill is to encourage physicians to talk
openly to their patients about insurance coverage and treatment
options.'95 However, as I read this enactment, it is much too
vague to adequately protect physicians from anything, much
less unlawful discharge. No mention is made of sanctions that
will be imposed on HMOs that retaliate against physicians nor
mechanisms to ensure that physicians achieve redress. In short,
due to its vagueness, I do not think that this bill will achieve
the results anticipated by the Massachusetts Medical Society.
192. Massachusetts Medical Society, Massachusetts Medical Society Wins Victory to
Protect Patient Communications: Physician "Gag Clauses" Now Prohibited, (Jan. 19, 1996)
(news release on file with author) [hereinafter Massachusetts Medical Society].
193. Id.
194. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 176G, § 6 (1996) (emphasis added).
195. See Massachusetts Medical Society, supra note 192 (acknowledging that physicians
should be encouraged to openly discuss medical care with patients).
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3. Washington
On February 15, 1995, months before the media focused
its attention on the existence of gag provisions in provider-
HMO contracts, Washington legislatures foreshadowed the
existence of these clauses, and when coupled with at-will em-
ployment, the problems they would cause physicians.'96 Un-
fortunately, House Bill 1945 was referred to the Committee on
Health Care over one year ago and nothing appears to have
happened since.
House Bill 1945, section 10(4)(e) is the only proposal that
I have seen which strikes at the heart of the gag clause
problem by prohibiting the termination of physicians' contracts
"without cause."'97 The bill not only prohibits at-will con-
tracts, but also states that plans must provide lawful reasons for
the denial or termination of a physician's contract, and man-
dates a due process appeal from all adverse decisions.198 As I
will discuss infra, the only way to ensure that physicians can
practice medicine as they see medically and ethically fit, re-
gardless of whether contracts have gag clauses, is to prohibit
at-will employment.
House Bill 1945, section 3(2) also attempts to prohibit
managed care organizations from more subtly retaliating
against physicians. This portion of the bill states:
No entity supervising physicians may impose on a physician
adverse consequences of any kind because of referring patients
for care to facilities or practitioners other than those approved
by the supervising entity where the physician in good faith
believes that there is a substantial patient care justiflcation for
doing so and that the care was otherwise unavailable."9
At first glance this portion of the bill appears to provide pro-
tection from subtle reprisals even if physicians recommend care
that is prohibited by gag clauses. However, what worries me
about this section is that physicians need "substantial" justifica-
tion to prescribe services that are not approved by the supervis-
196. See H.B. 1945, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (protecting physicians from
termination "without cause" as well as common gag provisions in managed care contracts).
197. See id. § 10(4)(e).
198. See id. § 10(4)(f.
199. Id. § 3(2) (emphasis added).
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ing entity. Does this mean that a physician is not protected
from retaliation if he only has a "reasonable" or "appropriate"
justification to recommend the treatment? Might this high
degree of justification preclude physicians from recommending
tests or referrals merely to rule out the possibility that an indi-
vidual has a particular illness? Furthermore, what happens to a
physician who acts without substantial justification? If her
employment is terminated and she cannot get hired elsewhere
due to the termination, what recourse does she have if a court
subsequently decides that she acted "in good faith" and had
"substantial justification?" Finally, this bill does not state what
procedures a physician must go through to be afforded protec-
tion from retaliation, nor does it impose sanctions on supervis-
ing entities should they unlawfully retaliate. In conclusion,
though this portion of the bill has potential, it leaves too many
unanswered questions to be truly effective.
The Washington Senate was also busy foreshadowing
problems physicians would face and on February 15, 1995
recommended a bill that provides whistle-blower protection for
any individual who complains about the quality of care provid-
ed by a health plan." ° This bill preserves the confidentiality
of the whistle-blower as long as the complaint is made in good
faith. The good faith requirement may pose problems for phy-
sicians because managed care entities can use that subjective
test to discredit a physician's complaint.
The bill further states that a whistle-blower who experi-
ences reprisal or retaliatory action' is entitled to the reme-
dies provided under the Washington Revised Code, chapter
49.60.225.2' The remedies provided by this Chapter include
compensatory damages, actual damages, equitable relief, and a
civil penalty of $3000 imposed upon the retaliator. 3 On a
200. See S.B. 5935,54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995).
201. Reprisal or retaliatory action means, but is not limited to:
Denial of adequate staff to perform duties; frequent staff changes; frequent and
undesirable office changes; refusal to assign meaningful work; unwarranted and
unsubstantiated letters of reprimand or unsatisfactory performance evaluations;
demotion; reduction in pay; denial of promotion; suspension; dismissal; denial of
employment; and a supervisor or superior encouraging coworkers to behave in a
hostile manner toward the whisteblower.
Id at 5(2)(b).
202. See id. at 5(l).
203. See hi. However, this Chapter does not appear to provide for punitive damages. See,
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positive note, this bill allows a whistle-blower to sue for dam-
ages which may make their whistle-blowing more financially
worthwhile. Additionally, a civil penalty of $3000 is imposed
on the wrong-doer which may have a deterrent effect on future
malfeasance. However, though I commend the Senate for ex-
plicitly encompassing health care providers in their whistle-
blower statute, as discussed previously, studies have shown that
whistle-blower statutes may not increase the number of claims
brought nor offer protection from subtle reprisals.
4. Illinois
On February 6, 1996, the Illinois House introduced House
Bill 2876, "The Managed Care Patient Rights Act."' 4 This
bill addresses the economic tensions that managed care has
created for physicians 5 and creates protective mechanisms to
ensure the quality of patient care.2" Overall, this bill seems
to effectively ensure the delivery of quality care to patients as
well as adequately protect physicians from retaliation. Many of
the questions and issues left unanswered by previously dis-
cussed bills, are sufficiently dealt with by the Illinois bill.
Section 5-10 enumerates "[m]edically appropriate health
care protection. 2 7 This section states that the public policy
of Illinois mandates that physicians advocate0 8 for medically
e.g., McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 51 F.3d 805, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that punitive
damages are not available under Washington law due to the plain adoption of federal remedies).
204. H.B. 2876, 89th Gen. Assembly (111. 1996) (addressing the rights that patients have
when dealing with managed care entities).
205. See id. § 1-5(b). "Managed care entities have the ability to discontinue physicians and
other health care providers from their networks effectively precluding patients from being able to
choose these physicians ... and preventing health care providers from treating patients who wish
to use their services. Finally, cost considerations can be used by these entities to prevent
expenditures for high cost medically necessary care, often with little or no appeal.' Id.
206. See id. "Managed care entities ... are responsible for making coverage decisions which
have a direct effect on the health of patients. Some of these entities make decisions concerning the
medical necessity, appropriateness of alternative treatments and length of hospital stays,
sometimes with little or no medical input, which can jeopardize the health and welfare of
patients .... Strong provider-patient relationships, particularly for patients with acute or chronic
medical conditions, may enhance the curative process." Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. To advocate for medically appropriate health care means to "appeal a payor's
decision to deny payment for a service pursuant to the reasonable grievance or appeal procedure
established by a managed care plan.., or to protest a decision, policy, or practice that the
physician... reasonably believes impairs the physician's ... ability to provide appropriate health
care to his or her patients. " Id. § 5-10.
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appropriate health care for patients. Furthermore, a managed
care plan is prohibited from retaliating against a physician who
advocates "appropriate health care. '0 9 Unlike in Washington,
discussed previously, where a physician needed "substantial
justification" to prevent unjust retaliation, in Illinois, the stan-
dard is much lower. This standard gives physicians much more
control in the deqcision-making process of prescribing and rec-
ommending care which, as discussed earlier, managed care
entities have gradually taken from them.
Second, the Illinois bill states that a managed care entity
that terminates or penalizes physicians "for advocating for ap-
propriate health care consistent with that degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by physicians ... practicing in the
same or a similar locality and under similar circumstances
violates the public policy of this State." ' Likewise, this vio-
lation constitutes a business offense subject to a $10,000
fine.' "- This bill clearly sets out the standard that will be used
to determine "appropriate health," outlines a clear expression
of public policy, and most importantly, imposes a substantial
sanction on managed care entities that unlawfully retaliate. It is
likely that the imposition of a $10,000 fine will serve as a
powerful incentive for managed care entities not to retaliate
against their providers.
Third, the Illinois bill discusses the unlawful restraints gag
provisions place on physicians" 2 and states that any managed
care entities that impose these restraints will be subject to a
$10,000 fine2 3 and/or the managed care entity may be en-
joined from operating." 4 The threat of shutting a managed
care organization's doors provides a powerful disincentive to
gagging physicians.
209. Id. § 5-10(a).
210. Id.§5-10(c).
211. Seeid. §5-10(c)&§20-15(a).
212. See id. § 5-25. "No managed care plan may prohibit or discourage health care providers
from discussing any alternative health care services and providers, utilization review and quality
assurance policies, terms and conditions of plans, and plan policy with enrollees, prospective
enrollees, providers, plans, or the public." Id.
213. See id. § 5-25 & § 20-15(a) (imposing fines if managed care plans restrain physicians'
communications).
214. See id. § 5-25 & § 20-55 (giving the Director of Public Health the authority to bring an
action to enjoin an entity that violates prohibitions against restraining physician's
communication).
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Finally, the Illinois bill states that if a managed care plan
terminates a physician's contract, it must provide a detailed
written statement to the physician enumerating the reasons for
termination." 5 Though at first glance this statement appears
to eliminate termination "without cause," this section also
states that a provider's contract can be terminated for "any rea-
son." 6 It is therefore unclear whether the Illinois legislature
intends to eliminate at-will employment.217 Furthermore, the
Illinois bill allows a physician's employment to be terminated
due to "substantially economic factors." This creates a tremen-
dous loophole in the effectiveness of this bill because in es-
sence it creates an implicit gag clause on physicians. Though
Illinois managed care plans may not explicitly prevent physi-
cians from recommending services not covered by the plan, if
a physician spends too much of the plan's money advocating
for his patients, he can be deselected for that very reason.1
Thus, though the Illinois bill deals with many issues more ef-
fectively than other states, allowing deselection due to econom-
ic factors leaves a large loophole for potential abuse.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As the previous analysis has shown, neither present statu-
tory and common law protections, nor pending legislation spe-
cifically designed to protect physicians from gag provisions
and subsequent retaliation, enables physicians to practice medi-
cine as they see medically and ethically fit. I therefore propose
the following recommendations in the hope that state legisla-
215. See id. § 5-35(a)(3).
216. See id.
217. See id. § lO-5(b)(G)(vii) which states that a physician's employment can be terminated,
with 15 days notice "based substantially on economic factors." Id. In my opinion, this creates a
tremendous loophole in the effectiveness of this Bill because one of the primary purposes of gag
provisions is to control the amount of money a managed care organization has to spend on its
patients. Thus, allowing deselection due to economic factors, creates an implicit gag provision on
physicians.
218. Fear of financial penalty is commonplace for HMO affiliated physicians. See, e.g.,
Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO: Some Can be Counted on in a Pinch, But Many Delay or
Deny Crucial Care if You Require Expensive Tests or Procedures. Here's How to Protect
Yourself, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23 1995, at 54, 55. Peter Moore, a 46-year-old professor at the
University of Illinois College of Medicine, was awarded $6.4 million in his suit against Rush
Anchor HMO. Id. Describing the predicament, Moore's attorney stated, "I believe doctors are
given a message about expenses they incur when they come up for salary review." Id.
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tures will take them into consideration when voting on upcom-
ing bills.
[1]: First, state legislatures must make it an affirmative
duty for physicians to tell patients what services are necessary
for their health, despite whether the services are offered by the
patients' plan. In addition, to ensure that patients receive prop-
er care, states must also mandate that HMOs have a similar
duty to treat.
To understand why a similar affirmative duty must be
imposed on HMOs, one must evaluate what a patient's options
are when he is told that he is sick and needs to seek care that
is not covered by his plan.
Patients, just like physicians, are often locked into "no-
win" situations. For example, a patient may not be able to
change HMOs because his employer does not offer any alterna-
tive programs. Thus, even if a patient is told that his HMO
does not provide the needed service, financially he may not be
able to afford to go elsewhere. Furthermore, even if a patient
could financially afford to receive treatment elsewhere, if a
patient is sick, other HMOs will be reluctant to provide him
with coverage." 9 Thus, even if a patient has been told that he
should seek care elsewhere, in actuality, that patient may have
no place to go to receive that care. To alleviate this problem,
in addition to mandating that physicians disclose to patients
necessary services, even if not offered by their plan, HMOs
must also have an affirmative duty to provide that care if the
patient seeks the care elsewhere and is denied. Thus, both the
physician and the IMO must have affirmative duties to pro-
vide necessary treatment.
Physicians and HMOs will continue to argue over whether
services are "necessary" or merely "beneficial." I do not pur-
port to have a complete solution to this debate; however, if
state legislatures clearly enumerate that both physicians and
HMOs have affirmative duties to patients, there certainly will
be less room for debate.
Critics may also argue that the affirmative duties imposed
upon HMOs and physicians will prevent cost saving which is
219. Likewise, HMOs would have the same affirmative duty to provide care if a patient
could not financially afford to go elsewhere.
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the primary impetus for managed care. This criticism is under-
mined by the observation that no money is saved when neces-
sary care is denied and tragedy occurs.
[2]: As stated previously, a large percentage of physicians
rely on their enrollment in managed care plans for the majority
of their patients. If physicians "blow the whistle" by telling
patients about gag clauses or by retaliating against the clauses
in another manner, physicians risk being deselected.
Physicians fear deselection for two primary reasons. First
and foremost, the physician loses patients if she is deselected
from a particular HMO. Secondly, when a physician is dese-
lected from an HMO, that is considered an "adverse action"
and must be reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank.m To make matters worse, the information stored at
the National Practitioners Data Bank must be checked by a
hospital when a physician applies for hospital privileges and
subsequently every two years." In addition, health care enti-
ties which have, or may be entering into an employment or af-
filiation relationship with a physician, have access to these re-
cords.m As a result, a health care entity may choose not to
hire a physician based on the information stated therein. Thus,
adverse actions taken by managed care entities, whether well-
founded or not, are lethal to a physician's future ability to
practice medicine.
In short, in order to ensure that unfounded deselection
does not harm competent physicians, modifications must be
made regarding the communication of adverse actions to the
National Practitioner Data Bank. Minimally, there must be the
opportunity for both HMOs and physicians to attach comments
to the report, which state the individual party's account of the
adverse action.' Finally, if a physician is deselected but
wins a wrongful discharge claim, procedures must be imple-
220. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-
11152, establishes a National Practitioner Data Bank for adverse information on physicians and
other health care practitioners. The HCQIA Regulations are codified in 45 C.F.R. § 60.10-60.14
(1995).
221. Seeid. §60.10(a)(1)-(2).
222. See id. § 60.1 l(a)(4).
223. Though an HMO may be apprehensive about hiring a "potential troublemaker," at least
a physician is given to opportunity to "defend" himself.
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mented to ensure that the Data Bank removes the adverse
report from the physician's file. 4
[3]: One way to prevent managed care entities from un-
justly terminating physicians is for legislatures to ban at-will
employment for physicians.2" Permitting the existence of at-
will employment for physicians gives them freedom of speech
and then, in essence, takes away their right to due process. One
author describes at-will employment the following way:
Imagine a society whose citizens had free speech rights but no
due process rights. The government could imprison citizens or
banish them for any reason, without notice or a hearing or proof
of the charges; but it could not punish citizens based on their
criticism of the government or other protected speech. The
citizen who believed she had in fact been punished for speaking
against the government could go to court, and, if she could
prove it, secure relief. How free would speech be in such a
system? Would citizens feel free to challenge the regime with-
out fear of retaliation?'
Mandating that termination of physicians' contracts be "for
cause" would force employers to legally justify a physician's
termination. Furthermore, for-cause employment is more likely
to provide physicians with an appeal process and a forum,
other than the courts, within which to work out differences of
opinions. 7 The elimination of at-will contracts no doubt pre-
224. The adverse report should not be removed until a physician successfully defends his
retaliatory discharge claim. Though, as stated throughout this Note, it is extremely difficult to
prevail with a retaliatory discharge claim, if a physician is permitted to remove the adverse report
any time prior to his successful claim, the health and welfare of patients could be seriously
jeopardized. For example, if a physician could remove the adverse action report while a claim
was pending, a physician who is deselected due to incompetence or malpractice could file a bogus
suit just so that she could continue to practice medicine during that time.
225. There may in fact be a light at the end of the tunnel regarding physicians' at-will
employment status. On April 9, 1996, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the
"public interest and fundamental fairness demand that a health maintenance organization's
decision to terminate its relationship with a particular physician provider must comport with the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and may not be for a reason that is contrary to public
policy." Harper v. HealthSource, 674 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1996). The Court went on to clarify
its decision by stating that a terminated physician is entitled to review of the termination decision,
whether the termination was for cause, or without cause. Id. Although the Court specifically
stated that it was not eliminating an HMO's contractual right to terminate its relationship with a
physician without cause, the court took a step in the right direction by enumerating for the
physician a course of action.
226. Estlund, supra note 108, at 101-02.
227. Underscoring the ongoing tensions between physicians and HMOs, groups of anes-
thesiologists at three Long Island, New York hospitals have sued Aetna Health Plans of New
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cludes physicians from terminating their relationship with man-
aged care entities "without cause." However, it will also give
them greater job security in an increasingly insecure health
care market and will increase their willingness to speak out
against unjust and unlawful practices.' 8 Therefore, I believe
that physicians would welcome the tradeoff.
In addition to eliminating employment at-will, deselection
due to economic factors should not automatically be a valid
"cause" for termination. As mentioned previously, allowing
physicians to have their employment terminated due to the
amount of revenue that they raise, creates a tremendous loop-
hole within which managed care entities can implement unspo-
ken/unwritten gag policies. To protect physicians from unjust
termination while at the same time permitting HMOs to survive
tough financial times, legislatures should mandate specific
procedural steps for HMOs to take when they terminate a
physician due to financial restructuring. 9
If HMOs financially need to reorganize the services that
they provide to enrollees, then they should be also required to
make reasonable efforts to find placement for physicians who
are terminated. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the
physician was not terminated due to her performance quality,
but rather, because the HMO was restructuring or reducing its
physician network. Finally, should termination occur due to
restructuring, physicians should not be required to report their
termination to the National Practitioner Data Bank. Thus, be-
cause HMOs will have an affirmative duty to mitigate damages
York Inc. See Scott Falk, New York Anesthesiologists Sue Aetna Alleging Coercive Contracting
Practices, 1 BNA's MANAGED CARE REP., Aug. 30,1995, at 221. According to the complaint, the
anesthesiologists sought changes to their contract, including a stipulation that physicians would
have the right to appeal adverse decisions made by Aetna, and Aetna refused to modify its
standard agreement. Id.
228. Foundation Health Corporation's 1992 termination of Sacramento OB-GYN William
Miller after he publicly made derogatory comments about the health plan, represented "the first
time in [Sacramento] a physician has been let go for reasons other than quality of care." Kreier,
supra note 28, at 5. Not quite three years later, Medical Society Executive Director William
Sandberg reported that both "mass terminations and contracts prohibiting patients [sic; should
state physicians] from contacting patients' to tell them what [has] happened have become
commonplace." Id.
229. Even with my suggestions, physicians are not completely protected from retaliation.
However, by mandating economic discharge procedures at least HMOs will have a duty to
mitigate damages to physicians.
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to physicians, a termination of this type will have fewer ad-
verse effects on future employment possibilities.
[4]: As an alternative to prohibiting at-will employment
for physicians, state legislatures must take steps to enable phy-
sicians to recover under the public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine. State legislatures must express clear statements
of public policy which will provide physicians with a founda-
tion for a common law suit for retaliatory discharge. In enu-
merating the state's public policy, legislatures must prohibit as
a lawful reason for discharge the difference of medical opinion
between a physician and a non-physician decision maker. This
will prevent situations that are analogous to Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corporation, as discussed previously, from
occurring." Furthermore, by doing so, physicians will regain
much of the medical decision-making control they have lost to
non-physician decision makers."3
[5]: In addition, state legislatures must also take steps to
enable physicians to recover under existing whistle-blower
statutes. State legislatures must extend the length of the statute
of limitations for bringing actions under state whistle-blower
statutes. Few individuals who are discharged from employment
have the wherewithal or knowledge to file a claim within a
couple of weeks (which is commonly the statute of limita-
tions). Regardless of whether the statute of limitations is ex-
tended, legislatures should educate physicians of the time
frames within which claims must be brought. Moreover, they
should make it clear that if claims are not brought within the
enumerated deadlines, statutory whistle-blower claims will be
precluded.
[6]: State legislatures also must take steps to further edu-
cate physicians on the mandatory procedural requirements to
filing a claim under state whistle-blower statutes. Often, whis-
tle-blowers with valid claims are precluded from recourse
because they do not follow the proper procedural channels.
230. See supra footnotes 125-37 and accompanying text.
231. It should be noted that in California several HMOs have been formed by physicians
that solely employ physicians on the utilization review boards. This enables medical decisions to
remain with the medical profession and precludes many of the issues discussed in this Note from
occurring.
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Thus, the legislature must ensure that physicians are educated
so that they are not precluded from recovery on the basis of a
statutory procedural technicality.
[7]: Presently, few state whistle-blower statutes award
punitive damages to whistle-blowers or impose harsh sanctions
on wrongdoers. Thus, there is little incentive for those aware of
a problem to blow the whistle; and likewise, there is no
disincentive for wrongdoers to retaliate against whistle-blowers.
Present state whistle-blower statutes traditionally award
whistle-blowers reinstatement and backpay. This does not ade-
quately reward a whistle-blower physician, who not only fears
losing his job, but also fears being blacklisted from employ-
ment with all other HMOs. Additionally, reinstatement may not
be the ideal solution for a physician who risks subtle reprisals
from HMO management and co-workers once she returns to
work. The availability of punitive damages will award a physi-
cian for her heroic disclosure and will hopefully punish HMOs
enough so that it will not be cost-effective for them to imple-
ment gag provisions (whether in writing or in practice).
Legislatures must also impose harsh sanctions on managed
care entities that promote gag protocols or that unlawfully
retaliate against their physicians. The Illinois bill did this very
well. In Illinois, violation of the proposed "Managed Care
Patient's Right Act" results in a $10,000 civil fine and/or being
enjoined by the State Department of Health. These strict sanc-
tions coupled with punitive damages would force managed care
entities to think twice before unlawfully imposing gag provi-
sions or retaliating against physicians.
[8]: Unfortunately for whistle-blowers, neither common
law protections nor statutory protections prevent wrongdoers
from more subtle forms of retaliation than termination. For
example, what can protect a whistle-blower from poor perfor-
mance reviews, shunning from co-workers, banishment to a
smaller office, restrictions on the use of facilities, verbal ha-
rassment, or denial of promotional opportunity? To help elimi-
nate these subtle reprisals I have a few recommendations.
First, the identity of whistle-blowers must, at all costs,
remain confidential. Therefore, it should be at the whistle-
blower's discretion whether confidentiality would best be pro-
tected by an internal or external complaint system. Whistle-
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blowers best know the nature of their individual HMOs and are
better able (than state legislatures) to determine whether an in-
ternal complaint will be an effective means for having the
HMO remedy the problem."2 If complaints are made exter-
nally, because the whistle-blower fears subtle retaliation if the
complaint is made internally, the State Department of Health
and Safety could be a possible complaint receiver. 3 Though
external reporting denies the parties the opportunity to remedy
a solution privately, it will prevent HMO management from
blacklisting a physician whistle-blower. 4
Secondly, legislatures must mandate that managed care
entities keep records of, and provide reasons for, all promo-
tions, demotions, relocations, and terminations. By forcing
managed care entities to document more of their administrative
decisions, and by keeping the identity of whistle-blowers confi-
dential, it will be much more difficult for managed care organi-
zations to subtly retaliate against whistle-blowers.
[9]: Physicians have to weigh the threat of medical mal-
practice if they do not provide a necessary service to a patient
against the threat of discharge and/or subtle reprisals if they do
recommend the service (which is contrary to the gag). If the
threat of malpractice is greater than the threat of retaliation,
then a physician may blow the whistle. However, do consum-
ers really want to go to a physician who is forced to weigh
these terrible alternatives? All enacted legislation and proposals
to date are much too vague in what they prohibit managed care
entities from doing. It is not enough to simply state "gag pro-
visions are void and unenforceable." Instead legislation must
232. HMOs would most likely prefer this type of complaint system because it gives them a
chance to remedy the problem privately. However, an internal complaint system cannot be
effective if the HMO will terminate the whistle-blower instead of remedying the problem. Thus,
whether a physician complains internally or externally must be left up to her discretion.
233. I recognize that there may be delay problems if adverse actions must be reported to
external organizations fast; however, due to the tremendous threat of subtle reprisals, internal
complaints, in some HMOs will not be effective.
234. Critics may argue that the complaining physician's identity will become known during
the course of the investigation since presumably the physician is complaining about an incident
that she was involved in. However, this should not be the case because generally gag-like policies
effects all participating physicians of an HMO and not a single doctor. Though not all physicians
of a particular plan will be effected equally, generally, all physicians will be effected in one way
or another.
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be enacted that makes it mandatory for provider-HMO con-
tracts to include the following clauses:
[a]: [HMO] will not in any way prevent a physician
from providing a patient with full and informed consent even if
that means disclosing to a patient the existence of a service, a
treatment, or a provider that is not covered by the patient's
plan.
[b]: [HMO] will not in any way prevent a physician
from fulfilling her fiduciary obligations to a patient. Therefore,
each physician must disclose to her patients the following: 1)
the payment system that she is on; 2) any bonuses or incen-
tives she receives or could receive; 3) the requirements the
physician must meet to receive those bonuses or incentives; 4)
any other information the physician believes affects her medi-
cal judgment or potentially causes a conflict of interest.
[c]: [HMO] may not in any way restrict communica-
tions between a physician and a patient. This includes, but is
not limited to, allowing physicians to speak with candor about
the quality and/or quantity of services provided by the patient's
plan, as well as recommending other plans, services, or provid-
ers that might better serve the patient's medical needs.
Conclusion: It is my hope that the above stated legal anal-
ysis and recommendations will decrease the number of Carley
Christies that you come in contact with during your lifetime.
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